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INTRODUCTION:
GERMAN DEFINITIONS OF AIR LAW1

The term "Luftrecht" (air law) was employed in German jurisprudence for the first time about forty years ago. It was at that
time used in a general sense to refer to the relation of human beings
to the air space. In that connection Jurisch, in his treatise "Grundzaige des Luftrechts" (1897), discusses as 'air law' (Luftrecht) the
rules about how to utilize the air and how to keep it clean. In another
treatise on "Luftrecht" 2 he deals with the legal protection against
contamination of air by steam, waste gas, etc. Weck, in his treatise
on "Luftrecht" 3 makes the following divisions: (1) The use of the
air for breathing. (2) The air as a thing in itself. (3) The use of
the column of air above a piece of land in connection with the use
of the underlying land. (4) For the transmission of intelligence.
(5) For aeronautics or aviation (Luftfahrt). At that time the Germail writers .usually called the law governing this last-mentioned use
of the air for aeronautics or aviation "Luftfahrtrecht" oder "Luftschiffahrtsrecht" (law of aerial voyage or navigation). Today the
term "Luftrecht" generally signifies "rules regulating traffic in the
air".4
The German decisions dealing with air law are in part obsolete
because of later legislation; nevertheless, even these judicial opinions
may be of interest, not only by way of comparison and as illustrations
1. The aim of this paper is not to give a systematic and complete treatise
on German Air Law, but only to review German cases that have dealt with
the subject. However, under the structure of the German legal system, such
review can only be understood in connection with the corresponding rules of the
several German acts, particularly the Air Traffic Act, and the various ordinances
Reference has therefore been made to the principal rules and ordinances on
which the decisions are based in order to save the reader from continually
consulting the texts Itself.
Until the Air Traffic Act came into effect, the few cases of general interest
dealing with air law concerned liability; this paper follows
the temporal sequence
of the decisions; besides this, the exposition is arranged according to the system
of the Air Traffic Act. Cases which are based on other provisions are fitted into
this system.
As to the terminology I tried to translate German law terms by a coniparable American term notwithstanding certain differences in the meaning
of
both terms. As far as the difference might impair the understanding I tried to
show it.
If there was no American term which seemed to be suited I tried
to translate in the literal sense.
2. Das Luftrecht in der Deutschcn Geiverbeordnung. 1905.
3. Luftrecht. 1913.
4. Hirschberg in Schlegelberger's Rechtsvergleichendem Handwrterbuch
(Encyclopedia of German and foreign comparative law) article "Luftrecht" A I;
consult Oppikofer in Archiv fUr Luftrecht, I 4: "Regulations to be applied to the
peculiar facts of aviation." This newest German terminology is more restricted
in meaning than the American "Air Law."
In the United States "Air
Law" is not confined to aviation, but also refers to "Radio Law." (e.g. Zollman,
"Law of the Air," Air Law Review, etc.)
But even in this country writers
sometimes disagree on the extension of Air Law to Radio Law. Caldwell 1930
(16) Am. Bar Ass. 458. The development in Italy is characteristic
the
term "Diritto Aereo" (r law) primarily used in the modern Germanwhere
sense is
found too vague and is gradually being replaced by the more accurate
term
"Diritto Aeronautico" (law of aviation) (Ambrosini, Corso di Diritto Aeronautico
I, 8). In France, writers are aware of the inaccuracy of the generally-used term
"'Droit airlen" for "tout ce qui concerne la locomotion adrienne," (all references
to flying aircraft), but French writers now feel that it is too late to change an
expression which was introduced by Andr6 Henri-Couannler in the year 1909.
(Le Goff, Trait5 du Droit Aricn, no. 2. p. 4).
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of the historical development, but also as a means of understanding
the present situation.
PART I: TO THE AIR TRAFFIC ACT 1922.
CHAPTER

I.

PERIOD UNTIL THE WORLD WAR:

1. Although considerable work has been done in Germany since
1909 on behalf of the technical development of flying, 5 only a few
cases concerning air law were reported in the first few years of this
period. On the occasion of the 31st Congress of German Jurists
(Deutscher Juristentag) at Vienna in 1913, a questionnaire was prepared and sent to all German District Courts (Langerichte) and to
the Court of Appeal in Berlin (Kammergericht) inquiring as to the
frequency of suits caused by aircraft accidents. Only eight silts
were pending at that time, none of which was of general interest.
In answer to those who urged a complete codification of air law,
therefore, it was stated by other experts that there would be no need
for such codification since, in view of the small number of cases, the
general rules of German civil law would be sufficient.
2. The leading case for that period is the decision of the Reichsgericht (Supreme Court) of January 11, 19127 which concern the
Zeppelin accident near Echterdingen. At that time the question
whether an aviator's liability should be dependent upon negligence
or whether there should be liability without fault had been widely
discussed. On principle, the German law recognized liability only for
fault, but it might be reached through some rules a more comprehensive responsibility. This was founded on the idea that a person
who introduces particular risks has to answer for the damages resulting from such risks, even in the absence of negligence or malice.
Such a rule of absolute liability is recognized in the German laws
for the owner (holder) of animals,8 for railroads, 8a for the operator
(holder) of automobiles, 9 etc. Many authors' ° were of the opinion
5. At the end of the year 1913, 631 certificates for Pilots of Aeroplanes
were issued. The Deutsche Luftfahrerverband (Association of German Aviators) issued 899 certificates for Pilots of balloons before January 31, 1913. At
that time 35 persons had the certilicate for piloting airships.
6. Niemeyer, Gutachten und Verhandlungen dCs 81. Deutschen Juuratentages,
Vol. IT, p. 50, 55. At that time the Prussian Ministry of Interior issued an
ordinance in reference to the air traffic, but its purport was restricted in the
main to regulations for exhibitions by balloon ascents etc. The need of the
enactment of an air law was recognized by the German Reichstag in 1914.
(Session of March, 12.-Protokolle der 234. Sltzung, p. 8034).
7. IV. 86/11-78 RGZ.
8. Civil Code § 833.
8a. Liability Act of June 7, 1871 (Reichs Haftpfllchtgesetz).
gesetz).
9. Automobile Act § 7. (Gesetz fiber den Verkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen).
For definition of the term operator (holder) see note 31, 258 sq.
10. With different argumentation ; cf. Kohler, Luftfahrtrecht p. 14 ; Meurer,
Luftschiffahrtsrecht, p. 16 ; Kipp in 1908 Juristische Wochenschrift 644; Linckelmann in 1909 Juristische Wochenschrift 8; Krause in 1910 Recht 442 ; Hilty In
XIX Archly ftlr Wffentliches Recht 91 regarding the question as to whether an
aircraft might be considered as an automobile under the Automobile Act. The
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that an aviator's liability would have to be based upon an application
of these rules.
The Reichsgericht-de lege lata-did not agree with this view
and held that the rules regarding the liability for an endangerment
were exceptional provisions and therefore were not to be applied
to the particular circumstances of aviation. This case is important,
therefore, in that it established the principle that aviators were not
liable for damage inflicted unless in case of fault. Regarding negligence in aviation the Reiclasgericht demands that ordinary care be
exercised in preparing for the flight and in undertaking a forced
landing. On the other hand it rejected the view that flying in itself
amounted to negligence, 1 however it said: the specific risk of flying
requires that the aviator take proper, adequate and specific precau12
tions.
3. In a decision of July 1, 1920 the Reichsgericht' 3 refers to
several unreported decisions in which an aeroplane flying at a low
altitude frightened cattle by its loud noise. The Court said that in
those cases negligence of the pilot had been proved.
4. The principle "no liability without negligence or malice"
was acknowledged by other German courts, however. In 1912 a
Zeppelin flew over plaintiff's land at an altitude of about 65 feet
(20 meters) to avoid a thunderstorm. A team of plaintiff's horses
was frightened by the noise and bolted. The Landgericht Altona/
14
Elbe held that there was no liability without negligence or fault.
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) Kiel. 15 The Court stated furthermore, that it is a case of
emergency if an airship, in order to avoid a thunderstorm, cruises
over a piece of land upon which there are horses. Under § 904 of
the German Civil Code the owner may claim compensation for damage caused to him in this emergency. The owner of the airship is
liable even though he is not piloting the ship.
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart in a decision of Nov. 4, 1910-as reported by Weiss
in 1922 Recht 110-held that an airplane with wheels on the ground was under
the Automobile Act. See also Sauer In 1936 Verkehrsrechtiche Rundschau, Heft
2 Gruppe 6a, fol. 1.

11. An Idea occasionally found in the literature: Goldfeld in 1911 Juristische
Wochenschrift, p. 565 ; but generally opposed: Kipp In 1908 Juristische Wochenp 34; Alex Meyer, Das
schrift, p. 643: Zitelnan, Luftschiffahrtsrecht
1
Schadenseraatzrecht der Luftfahrt p. 69; Rump in Jherings Jahrbtichern des
btlrgerlichen Rechts, Vol. 49. p. 359; and others.
12. In France the Tribunal de Ia Seine (Jan. 24, 1906), D P 1907.2.17.
annoted by Planiol; (also Rlvue Jurldlque Internationale de Ia Locomotion
Adrienne, 1910, p. 20) approaches the principle of liability for risk and not for
fault (responsabilit6 de risque et non d6 faute) cf. Le Goff, Trait6 Th~orique et
Pratique de Drolt Arien, no 584, a.s.f.
13. 100 RGZ. 69.
The same principle is to be found in a decision of the Oberlandesgerieht,
14.
Naumburg 5.18, 1914 in 1914 Naumburger Anwalts Zeltung p. 65.
(1914 Schleswig-Holsteinischer Anzeiger, p. 49).
15.
December 4, 1913.

The decision of the Landgericht mentioned by Seligsohn in 1913 Jurstische Wochenschrift p. 72.
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PERIOD FROM

1914 TO 1922

1. Two decisions of. the Reichsgericht are reported regarding
damages caused by airplanes interfering with the land of another.
Both decisions do not apply to damages inflicted to persons, as the
Reichsgericht explains in a later judgment of March 26, 1932.16
a. In case V 97/19 of the Reichsgericht, decision of October 18, 191917 defendant established an aviation field on land adjoining plaintiff's, at which field defendant trained student flyers. Plaintiff sued successfully' 8 for restitution of the depreciation of his land,
the value of which was reduced by the noise of aircraft flying at a
low altitude over the land, simultaneously placing the users of said
land in apprehension of the possibility of a crash. So far as the
plaintiff had sought recovery on the basis of noise arising from the
activity on the aviation field itself, the court dismissed the suit for
damages.
b. In case VI 24/20, decision of July 1, 19201', a pilot who
had passed the pilots' examination, damaged the plaintiff's property
by crashing on it in a flight made in order to comply with further
conditions for his certificate. The Reichsgericht held the owner of
the air school liable.
In case V 97/19 supra, the plaintiff had petitioned in the beginning for an injunction against the manager of the school also. The
Reichsgericht dealt with the problem of the responsibility of the
manager of an air school for injury caused by the flights of students.
In conformity with the general opinion of the German courts, that
disturber (interferer) in the meaning of § 1004 of the Civil Code
is not. only the one who is acting personally, but also the one who
causes the infringement by his orders and allows it in an undue
manner in so far as there is a causal connection with the manifestation of his intention, 20 the Supreme Court determined that the manager of the aviation training school was also the disturber (interferer)
under the provisions of § 1004 Civil Code.
A. Both decisions deal with two kinds of titles:
1. § 905 German Civil Code, reading as follows: "The right
of the owner of a piece of land extends to the space above the surface and to the earth under the surface. However, the owner cannot
prohibit interferences which take place at such height or depths that
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
BeitrIge

III 178/25 (1928 Zeltschrift far Luftrecht 218).
97 RGZ. 25.
100 RGZ. 69.
100 RGZ. 69.
Cf. Decisions in 1904 Juristische Wochenschrift, p. 142; 54 Gruchot's
zum Deutschen Recht, p. 156 ; 92 RGZ. 22.
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he has no interest in their exclusion." 21 In reference to § 905 there
was a more theoretical problem as to whether the owner of the land
also owns the air space above, or whether he has, as a result of his
ownership of the land, a right to the air space which is similar to
that of the ownership of the land. 2 2 The Supreme Court held that
the right of the owner extends to the space above. However, there
is no encroachment on and no undue interference with his rights in
the meaning of §§ 1004 and 905 German Civil Code in case an aircraft should fly through the higher air space. The Court felt that in
the higher air space there is no necessity of affording the protection
23
of the law.
2. In decision V 97/19 supra, the Reichsgericht affirmed the
interest of the owner to prohibit interference by flying over his land,
because the noise was very loud and the flight was performed at a
low altitude.
3. To find whether an interest worthy of protection may exist,
the Supreme Court examined and considered the general view of
the community as to what interferences of aircraft the owner of
land is forced to submit to. Under certain circumstances the Court
said it might give consideration also to local customs.
4. In case VI 24/20 supra, the Reichsgericht considered that
the owner of land may be interested in preventing flying over his
land even though it is done at a great height. However, in such
cases, the land owner's right to prevention is restricted. The Court
felt that it would be possible to enforce a general stoppage of avidtion, and to avoid this result the Court deprived the owner of the
right to prohibit flight at high altitudes. The owner must resign his
right of prohibition so that "aviation, an economical, valuable means
of communication, which is to be developed to an absolute necessity,
may be used in the limits of due liberty and not hampered in a man2' '
ner disadvantageous for the commuuity.'
The Reichsgericht also applied to aviation cases the general rule
that without proof of fault, the aggrieved owner, because he was
25
forced to resign his right of prohibition, is entitled to damages.
This rule is applied for damages which are incurred in ordinary
21.
From the translation of the German Civil Code by Loewy.
The Air
Traffic Act of August 1, 1922 (Luftverkehrsgesetz) established the free use of the

air for aviation. Cf. Chapter 11 At.
22. Cf. Trusen, Luftjahrt und Grundeigentum with bibliography 3 Archiv
ftir Luftrecht 153, 281.
23. The same viewpoint was taken in the first draft of the Air Traffic Act
of 1913.

24. A similar point of view is expressed by Judgie James C. Michael of the
District Court of Minnesota in the case of Johnson v. Curtis Northlbest Airplane
Company, et al. 1928 JSAv. R. 42.
25.
47 RGZ. 99; 58 RGZ. 130; 97 RGZ. 291; 98 RGZ. 347; 101 RGZ. 102

145 RGZ. 107. In reference to the question of whether the rules are to be applied
under the Air Traffic Act Cf. below, Chapter II Ai and 158 RGZ. 34.
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aircraft operations; tile Supreme Court did not pass upon tie question of whether or not force majeure may be objected to.
B. Both decisions took into consideration whether or not the
plaintiff might be entitled to damages by the law of torts. Regarding
the problem of negligence, the following principles were laid down:
a. The manager of an air school is acting negligently when
lie knows of and allows students to fly outside of the boundaries of
26
the aviation field at a low altitude and with much noise.
b. Students must be trained within the boundaries of the avia27
tion field.
c. An unpractised pilot is negligent if he flies over inhabited
28
places, and his teacher is negligent in not preventing such flight.
d. A certified pilot is not negligent in flying over inhabited
no more risk than
places on a training flight, such a flight 2creating
9
is necessarily inseparable from aviation.
2. At this point reference may be made to the decision of the
Reichsgericht III 541/23 of June 17, 1924.30 The decision was rendered after the Air Traffic Act of August 1, 1922 was enacted, but
the rules of the act were not to be applied because the damage resulted
from an accident before-August 1, 1922.
The wire of a kite flown by the German Naval Observatory
was broken. It fell over a high tension line, touched the plaintiff's
cow and killed it. The Court repeated the principle that the operator
(holder)3 1 of the kite was liable regardless of negligence or malice
because the owner had no right to prohibit interference. The said
accident was believed to be a typical risk of operating the kites by
the observatory. The risk was aggravated when defendant continued to fly kites in the same place, although meanwhile a high
tension line was constructed across the aviation field.
PART II: GERMAN CASES SINCE THE AIR TRAFFIC
ACT OF 1922.
CHAPTER

I:

HISTORY OF LEGISLATION

32

-INTERNATIONAL

CONVENTIONS

1. The problem in what manner future legislation would be
most suitable for air traffic had been the subject of numerous Ger26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

97 RGZ. 25.
100 RGZ. 69.
100 RGZ. 69.
100 RGZ. 69.
108 RGZ. 310.
The operator or holder-German

aircraft on his own account maintains

"Halter"-Is a person who uses an

it, and has considerable

See notes 258 sq.
32. For the following see Grossmann,
nautical Law in 1908 Air Law Review 129.

Present

Status of

control over it.

German Aero-
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man articles and treatises, and in 1913 the German Government proposed to the Reichstag the draft of an Air Traffic Act. Unfortunately the deliberations of the Reichstag were interrupted by the
World War. Immediately after the end of the War, however, an
Authority for the Air (Reichsluftamt) was created for the purpose
of putting into effect a provisional regulation of aviation. 3 By the
Ordinance of December 7, 191834 the issuance of certificates was
required for the admission of air conveyance, for the operation of
aircraft, for the establishment of airports and for air navigation
enterprises. 5 A new draft of an Air Traffic Act was proposed by
the German Government in 1920 and the Act was promulgated
August 1, 1922.30 This Air Traffic Act comprehended the principal
rules for aviation.
Part I, under the title "Air Traffic", provided rules regarding
the admission of aircraft and pilots, airports, air navigation enterprises and affairs. (Luftfahrtunternehmungen und Luftfahrtveranstaltungen), traffic regulations, expropriation, and some general rules
empowering the government to issue statutes covering certain problems and rules for the decisions of the administrative authority.
Part II dealt with liability, and Part III with penalties. The act
provided that certain problems were to be ruled by ordinance and
such an ordinance was expected to be issued in a short time. Unfortunately, the Reichstag was dissolved several times and it was not
until July 19, 193037 that the Ordinance for Air Traffic was published. In the meantime, the needed completion for the practical use
of the Air Traffic Act was given by decrees of administrative authorities of the Reich and the German States. The purpose of the Air
Traffic Act was to put the police regulations for air traffic exclusively
under the jurisdiction of the Reich.3 8 Following the disposition of
the .Air Traffic Act it contained particular rules in order to put the
Act uniformly into effect.
2. When the National-Socialistic Government came into power,
the organization of the air navigation administration was funda33. Ordinances of November 26 1918 (1918 R. G. B. 1337). The Authority
later was made a part of the Traffic Ministry of the Reich (Reichsverkehrsministerium).
34. 1918 R. G. B1. 1407.
35. Subsequently various Acts and Ordinances were promulgated which
substantially were issued in fulfilling the political liabilities of the Treaty of Versailles: Acts of January 3, 1920 (1920 R. G. B1. 14) : June 29, 1921 (1921 R. G.
BI. 789); Ordinances of March 31, 1920

(1920

R

G. BI.

455); April 30, 1920

(1920 R. G. BI. 857) ; May 5, 1922 (1922 R. G. BI. 476).
36. Amended by Ordinances of February 5, 1924 (1924 R. G. B. I 43)
February 6, 1924 (1924 R. G. B1. I 42) ; February 6, 1924 (1924 R. G. Bl. I 44)
December 12, 1924 (1924 R. G. B. I 775).
37. 1930 R. G. B1. I 363.
38. ' State Regulations were provided by Art. 46 of the Air Traffic Ordinance

for the purpose of preserving the public security and order in airports and their
surroundings. The Ordinance did not make allowance for dispatching aircraft
by the customs and postal authorities.
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mentally 'altered. A Reichs Authority for Air Navigation 3 9 was
created for the purpose of supervising the enactment of the Air
Traffic Act and of the Air Police. The latter's competence was
finally comprehended by a new act in 1939.40 Furthermore, the new
Authority had to protect the safety of flying by providing the Air
42
Weather Service, 41 long distance signals and directional guidance,
and television. 4 3 In the meantime the Authority was charged with
air protection against air raids 44 and with the command of the air
force.

45

The Air Traffic Act was amended by the Acts of December 15,
1933,40 December 19, 1935, 4 and July 29, 1936,48 and republished

under the date of August 21, 1936.40 It was later amended by the Act
of September 27, 1938.5 o The Air Traffic Ordinance was amended
and promulgated in a new form under the date of August 21, 1936,51
and further amended March 31, July 12, and December 15, 1937,52
53
and September 30, 1938.
3. The aforesaid Acts and Ordinances are supplemented by
various international conventions. 54 Of particular importance among
these is the Warsaw Convention of October 12, 1929 which Germany
has signed and ratified. In reference to this Convention, Germany
promulgated the Act to Put in Effect the First Convention for the
39. Ordinances February 2, 1933 (1933 R. G. B1. I 35) ; February 22, 1933
(1933 R. G. BI. I 80) February 28, 1933 (1933 R. G. BI. I 87) ; April 18, 1934
(1934 R. G. Bl.I 310); May 5,1935 (1935 R. G. BI. I 241) ;March 26, 1935 (1935
. G. B. I 479) ; April 21, 1936 (1936 R. G. BI. I 383) ; September 8, 1936 (1936
R. G BI 729 748) ; October 8,1937 (1937 R. G. BI. I 1115) ; June 29, 1938 (1938
R. G. BI. I 7b9) ; August 31, 1938 (1938 R. G. Bl. I 1568).
40. The expression "Air Police" was replaced by "Air Supervision" (Luftaufsicht) ; the Act entitles the Authority to issue ordinances, decrees, and instructions and to enforce them. Act regarding the competence of the Air Navigation
Authority of February 1, 1939 (Luftaufschtsgesetz) and Ordinance of February
1, 1939 (1939 R. G. Bi. I 131).
41. Act of December 15, 1933 (1933 R. G. Bi. I 1077).
42. Ordinance of April 6, 1934 (1934 R. G. Bl. I 801).
43. Ordinances July 12 and December 11, 1935 (1935 R. G. BI. I 1059
1429).
44. Act of June 26, 1935 (1935 R. G. Bl. I 827) with different Ordinances.
(Luftschutzgesetz.)
45. Act of May 21, 1935 (1935 R. G. Bl. I 909) (Wehrgesetz).
46. 1933 R. G. BI I 1077.
47. 1935 R. G. Bl I 1516.
48. 1936 R. G. Bl. I 582.
49. 1936 R. G. BI. I 653.
50. 1938 R. G. 1I. I 1246.
51. 1936 R. G. Bl. I 659.
52. 1937 R. G. BI. I 432, 815, 1387.
53. 1938 R. G. Bl. I 1327.
54. Such bilateral conventions were concluded with many states and ratied, as:
Switzerland
Denmark
Norway
Netherlands
Italy
Russia
France
Great Britain
Belgium
Spain
Poland
Hungary
Greece
Jugoslavia
U. S. A.
Portugal
Czechoslovakia
Union or South Africa
Esthonia
The German Air Law was enacted for Austria by Ordinance April 1, 1938
(1938 R. G. Bl. 1 355) ; for the German parts of Czechoslovakia (Sudetendeutsches Gebiet) by Ordinance of November 30, 1928 (1938 R. G. Bi. I 1714)
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Unification of Private Air Law. 55 On January 12, 1937, the Second
Convention of May 29, 1935 (Rome Convention) regarding the Unification of Rules Relating to the Precautionary Attachment of Aircraft came into force together with the Act regarding the Inadnissibility .of the Precautionary Attachment of Aircraft. 50 The other
Rome Convention "relating to Damages caused by Aircraft to Third
Parties on the Surface '' 7 was not yet ratified by Germany. On the
other hand, the International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation of April 12, 1933 is in force in Germany. "
CrHAPTER

TI: AIR TRAFFIC

*A. Aircraft and Airmen.
1. Air Space.
a. Use of air space by flying over another's land.
§ I I of the Air Traffic Act reads as follows: "The use of
the air space by aircraft is free in so far as it is not restricted by this
Act and by the Ordinances promulgated to put it into effect." This
rule is called the "Magna Charta". of aviation; it means that flying
over another's land is usually lawful as long as the flyer complies
with the rules and regulations for permits and for traffic. The owner
is deprived of his veto power also in such cases where he may be
interested in a veto according to § 905 German Civil Code.5 9 Under
such regulation the problem arises of whether the owner of the land
over which the aircraft is flown is entitled to compensation in so
far as his interests are prejudiced. The Air Traffic Act deals only
with liability for accidents (§§ 19 sequ.) and § 28 provides that
the Air Traffic Act does not affect other Acts of the Reich according
to which the operator (holder) or the person who uses the aircraft is
liable to a wider extent, or according to which the pilot or another
person is liable. As stated above, the Reichsgericht had held that
the owner of land over which an airplane was flown might be entitled
to damages according to general rules, and that the principle rule
applies that without proof of fault, the owner is entitled to damages
if under other regulations lie has to resign his right of prohibition.
This principle was based on §§ 905 and 1004 German Civil Code
55. Gesetz zur Durchfilhrung des ersten Abkommens zur Vereinhetitlchung
des Luftprivatrechts of November 30, 1933 (1933 R. F. BI, 1 1079). See also notification regarding the Warsaw Convention of November 30, 1933 (1933 R. G. BI.
11 1039).
56.
Act of March 17, 1935 (1935 R. G. BI. I 385). See also notiflication of
said Convention: 1935 R. G. BI. II 301. Translation 1937 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 335: "Attachment of mesne process" in common law.
57.
Translation: 1937 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 312.

(1935 R. G. B1. II 815).

58.

Notification of November 13, 1935

59.

Cf. Grossmann, 1938 Air Law Review 136.

Ordinance of June 2, 1937 (1937

R. G. BI. 1I 1 611).

See also

See 1935 USAvR. 185.
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and § 75 Introduction Code of Prussia, and the decisions 100
R. G. Z. 69 and 108 R. G. Z. 310 were founded on it. The Reichsgericht has also applied the rules of § 75, Introduction, Code of
Prussia still quite. recently, holding that this rule is not abrogated
by Art. 153 of the German Constitution. But it restricted the principle to cases where interference in a protected sphere was done
by the ordinance of an administrative authority; it was not applied
where interference was done by an act of legislation. 0 The problem
of whether, under the Air Traffic Act, damages may be established
for flying over another's land was discussed by the Reichsgericht in
the decision of July 4, .1938.1" The Supreme Court agreed with the
Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) that the said general principle
was not to be applied in the face of the positive rule of the Air Traffic
Act, and that the general restriction of the rights of the owner of
land in § 1 Air Traffic Act in behalf of air traffic, is only compensated by the principle of the strict liability in § 19, 1. c. The Court
felt that such interpretation was even more appropriate than the
conception that the character of real property had changed fundamentally since the earlier decisions were issued, and that § 28 Air
62
Traffic Act meant first and foremost the law of torts.
b. Use of airspace for advertisement:
The Air Traffic Act rules that the use of air space for aviation
is free, but it does not deal with the problem of whether the air
space may be used for advertising carried on by aircraft. The Amtsgericht Berlin-Tempelhof 63 discussed such a case. In 1930 defendant
organized a Constitution festival at the airport in Berlin-Tempelhof
in the course of which the ascent of two balloons covered with advertisements was shown. The owner of the airport had transferred to
plaintiff an exclusive right to undertake advertisement at the airport
and had assigned to him his pretended claim for damages against
defendant. The Court held that there was no maxim of law that
entitled the owner of land to a fee for the -use of the airspace above
the premises for advertisement in the air. § 905 German Civil Code
60. November 16, 1937-0. Z. S. 4/36 (VII 200/36)-156 RGZ. 303 (310)
)grand division) ; see also May 15, 1934-VII 27/34-144 RGZ. 325; see also
etober 20, 1909:--V 563/08-72 RGZ. 85.
61. V 17/38-158 RGZ. 34-1938 Archiv fur Luftrecht 290-1938 Zeitschrift Akademie fur Deutsches Recht 783 annotated by Reymann.
62. The German writers disagreed.
Koffka-Bodenstein-Koffka Lutvecrkehrsgesetz 1I, 5 § 28, p. 134 ; R16mer. 1935 Archly fur Luftrecht 171 ; StuadingerKober, German Civil Code (9) §905, 2 h; held the owner to be entitled to damages
caused by a flyer flying over his land provided that there is a special rule to be
applied. Schleicher-Reymann, Recht der Lufftfahrt (3) II, 1 § 28, 1 p. 142 ; Reymann. 1938 Zeitschrift Akademie fur Deutsches Recht 784, Oppikofer, 1933,
Archly fur Luftrecht 200 ; Trusen, 1933 Archly fur Luftrecht p. 197; Minster,
1936, Deutsche Juristenzeitung 287 feel that the Air Traffic Act deals definitively
with titles for damages. "Introducing a liability without fault which is the
strongest in German law, it was the purpose to call into existence a special rule
covering all damages resulting from the interference with Property or rights by
every endangerment that may be typical of aviation." (Reymann.)
63. 6b C 2421/30 April 16, 193.1-1931 Archly fir Luftrecht 151.
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entitles the owner to demand forbearance and eventually damages.
But the Court held that this did not apply because the owner had
had no objection to the ascent of the balloons and the Court did not
feel that there was any difference whether the balloons were covered with advertisements or not. The case was dismissed.- The Court
did not deal in an exhaustive manner with the problems arising from
the case. For our feeling the basis of the judgment had to be the
interpretation of the agreement between defendant and the owner of
the airport. By such interpretation it was to be found whether the
organizer of the festival was entitled under the agreement to make
use of the said balloons. The more important and interesting problem would be whether the owner of the land who is deprived of his
right of veto by § 1 of the Air Traffic Act has to permit not only
the flying over his land, but also the use of such a flight for advertisement. It seems that there are no other decisions reported dealing
4
with this problem.
2. Aircraft.
a. Gliders.
§ 1 11 of the Air Traffic Act contains the definition of aircraft.
The Act of 1922 enumerated aircraft as airships, airplanes, balloons,
kites and similar objects designated for movement in the air. Under
such regulation the Reichsgericht 65 decided that a glider falls within
the Air Traffic Act because it is designed for movement in the air.
The amendment of the Air Traffic Act, 1936, included gliders
expressly.
b. Seaplanes.
Seaplanes are not mentioned by the definition of § 1 of the Air
Traffic Act. There is no doubt that seaplanes are also under the
regulations of the Air Traffic Act. However, it may be doubtfulwhether the rules of maritime law are to be applied mutatis mutandis.6e No cases have arisen on this point. However, the Seeamt
64. In connection with the problem of sky writing cf. Trusen, 1933 Archly
flr Luftrecht 200 ; Alex Meyer, 1931 Juristische Wochenschrift 396; idem, 1931
Archly ftir Luftrecht 124. Writers generally think that the use of the air space
is free only for air traffic under the Air Traffic Act. Therefore, general rules should
be applied-as to whether the use of the air space for advertising Is to be allowed
or not. That means that the owner of land would have the right under § 905 German Civil Code as far as his interests are touched. The Reichsgericht (see 123
RGZ. 181; 1932 Juristische Wochenschrift 46) gave the following principles in
a case regarding the use of air space for a conduit: Under §905 s. 2, German
Civil Code, the owner of land is not prohibited to utilize his property as well as
possible and to turn it to account as far as it is offered to him voluntarily; but
heIs not allowed to use his right of veto in order to profit from not using his veto
against'an acting by which he is not disturbed.
65. Decision of November 13, 1928-I 972/28-62 RGSt. 312.
66. See Schleicher-Reymann, Note 12 to § 1 Air Traffic Act; Sebba, 1931
Archly ftir Luftrecht 127. On the other hand, Annex D, No. 58 Cina Convention
corrected text reads as follows: "Every aircraft manoevering under its own
power on the water shall conform to the Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea, and for the Purposes of these regulations shall be deemed to be a steam
vessel, but . . . " The German Air Traffic Ordinance 1930 (§77) referred to the
provisions of the police for rivers and navigation.

§ 43 Seewasserstrassenpordnung

(Codes for Traffic at Sea) of October 31, 1933 enacted such general provisions for
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Stettin (an admiralty court) which investigated the accident of a
seaplane and reported its findings 67 regarding the probable cause
of the accident and the performance of the pilot. On July 7, 1930
the seaplane Dornier Wal D 864 flying from Stettin-Altdamm to
Stockholm lost the propeller of the rear motor. The pilot made
an emergency landing at sea about 20 nautical miles south of the
island of Bornholm. A schooner, which also had a motor, towed
the aircraft toward Bornholm. As the weather became worse the
seaplane capsized. Some of the passengers and crew were drowned.
Under Section 2 of the See-Unfalluntersuchungsgesetz (See-Disaster Investigation Act) accidents to merchant ships are to be investigated by the Seeamt. The problem was, whether a floating seaplane
is to be considered as a ship in the sense of the said provision. The
Seeamt explained that "merchant ship" under the Act, means all
ships, regardless of construction and purpose, which are not part of
the Navy. Hence the Seeamt held that a seaplane, as soon as it
lands onl water, whether such landing is voluntary or not, was to
be considered as a ship 8 unless it is already a wreck upon reaching
the water. The said seaplane landing at sea was able to float and be
towed, even to propel itself by its own power. The Seeamt felt that
a finding of the causes of the accident in so far as it happened while
the plane was in the air, is beyond its investigation in the strictest
sense of the Act. However, it also covers the loss of the propeller
in the air because the deficiency of the rear motor affected the capacity
of the plane to be operated as a ship. The German writers generally
object to the decision of the Seeamt and there is no doubt that it
the sea water ways, i.e. the lower courses of the rivers navigable for sea-going
vessels. Said provisions are now to be applied generally under § 86 II, III Air
Traffic Ordinance: "Aeroplanes on the water have to avoid the vicinity of other
craft when the motor is running.
An airplane has to go into the wind without any delay, and any other craft
has to give way In case the courses of both are crossing in such a manner that it
would mean danger of collision to continue on them.
Any other craft has to give right of way to airplanes on the water as long
as the motor is not running; as far as possible, they have to sail past In the luff.
Otherwise the special provisions for the water on which they are crossing are
to be applied for seaplanes."
Such provisions are to be found in different local ordinances.
(Christensen, 1939 Archly ftr Luftrecht 9.)
The German writers agree that these regulations are not such as to change the character of the aircraft and to make it a
vessel. Cf. Wtistend6rfeer, 1931 Archlv fUr Luftreeht 207.) The London Conference in 1929 regarding assistance etc. at sea also agreed that the international
rules regarding salvage at sea are not to be applied to seaplanes. The Convention on Assistance and Salvage of Aircraft or by Aircraft at Sea (CITEJA Document 319)-10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 227 (See Latchford
10 idem 147) did not lay down the principle that seaplanes on the water are
vessels.
67. Seeamt Stettin August 13, 1930-1931 Archly fir Luftrecht 54-Translation in extenso by Professor Zollmann 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 588. Schielcher, Lufftverkehrsgesetz 1930 p. 195 mentions that in other cases also the Seeltmter investigated accidents of aircraft that happened at or over the sea and
that the Seelimter 'had always held such mishaps to be under their jurisdiction.
68. An Italian Court (Tribunale di Firenze) July 3, 1933 in re Societa
Rimorchiatori Livorno v. Mo Aeronautica: 1933 Rivista di Diritto Aeronautico
325, held an arbitrary act to discriminate whether a seaplane is flying or floating,
because under the Italian Code, the plane is always to be regarded as a plane, not
only if it Is flying.
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was not irrefutable regarding the meaning of the See-Unfalluntersuchungsgesetz. 69 Today, tinder the new organization of the administration of air navigation, the Authority for Air Navigation has to
investigate all accidents of aircraft within the supervision of air
traffic.
c. Aircraft as object of the Law of Things:
As there are no special provisions for aircraft in the German
law of things, the general rules of the German Civil Code regarding
things are to be applied. The Code discriminates between the component parts of a thing and its accessories. As to the component
parts of a thing there are under special rules the so-called essential
component parts. The law defines essential component parts as those
parts which cannot be separated from one another without destroying
or essentially changing the one or the other, and provides that they
may not be the object of separate rights.7 0 This rule has a broad
importance, especially regarding the reservation of ownership. He
who supplies a machine may reserve his ownership until all instalments of the price have been paid. The German Courts held that
under certain conditions a machine which is built into a factory
building or into a movable thing may be an essential component part
of the whole thing, and therefore could not be the object of a separate and reserved ownership. Regarding airplanes, the Oberlandesgericht in Hamburg 71 decided that the motor of an airplane becomes
an essential -component part of the aircraft since it is built into
72
the body.
d. Aircraft as object of contracts:
The air law, especially the Air Traffic Act, does not provide
special rules regarding the contents of contracts which deal with
aircraft.73 What rights and what' duties will arise from such contracts, therefore, is to be found in applying the general rules of the
German Civil Code. From the viewpoint of air law, it will only be
of interest in so far as the courts based their decision upon the peculiar characteristics of aircraft.
69. Sea Disaster Investigation Act. Cf. Schleicher-Reymann, note 12 § 1
Koffa-Bodenstein-Koffa, note II, 2a, § 1 ; Sebba, 1931 Archly fir Luftrecht 127.
70. § 93, German Civil Code.
71. Hanscatisches Oberlandesgericht, October 8, 1931-Bf II 299/31-1932
Archly fUr Luftrecht 105.
72. The problem of the essential component parts is one of the most contested
in German jurisprudence and the different sentences are not all homogeneous:
the characteristic of being essential component parts was denied for the motor of
an automobile: Oberlandesgericht Braunschweig, January 25, 1934 in 1934 Junstrische Wochenschrift p. 1258; for the motor of a dredge: Oberlandesgericht,
Marienwerder, December 14, 1930 in 1931 Deutsche Richter Zeltung 230; the
production motor of a ship for inland navigation: Oberlandesgericht K61n, October 14, 1935 in 1936 Juristische Wochenschrift 466. However, the keichsgericht
found the production motor of a sea-going ship to be an essential component part.
(August 4, 1936-152 RGZ. 91).
71. The provisions regarding liability (§§ 19 ss.) establish the liability by
law and independent of any contract.
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aa. Rent.
Defendant rented an airplane from the plaintiff for exhibition
purposes and passenger flights in the spring of 1925, and promised
to pay a fee of 1,50 RM for every kilometer of flight to and from
the home port of the plane and to and from the place where the
exhibition was to be held. The defendant refused to pay said fee
on the ground that the airplane flying to and from the airport where
the exhibition took place was used for the transportation of plaintiff's employees and that there was no chance for him to carry
passengers. The contract did not mention whether tle lessee should
have the right to have carried passengers in the flight to and from
the airport. The Court held 7 4 that since the contract itself was
silent, the extent of the lessor's duty to permit the lessee the undisturbed use of the aircraft had to be found according to the ordinary
usage (Verkehrssitte). The Deutsche Luftrat and the Chamber of
Industry and Commerce at Berlin delivered opinions on the question
of whether it was the ordinary usage in contracts relating to aerial
navigation that the charterer of an aircraft for a particular occasion
had the right to sell reservations to and from the place of exhibition.
The Deutsche Luftrat denied such custom. In its opinion of July 2,
1926 the Chamber of Industry and Commerce stated that there was
no custom either in a positive or in a negative sense 75 and that the
owner would charge more if he were not to have the right to use
the craft on the way to and from the place of the exhibition for
transporting employees and materials. Experts felt that a price
between 1 RM and 1,80 RM did not indicate the intention of the
owner to confer the right of selling reservations to and from the
place of exhibition. Hence, the Court held that the defendant had
to prove that the charged fee was agreed at such rate as contemplated the right of the charterer to sell reservations for the flight
to and from the place of exhibition and regarding the duty of the
owner to transport his employees and materials at his own expense.
But, as the Court stated, defendant did not even make such allegation,
and judgment was given against the defendant. It has to be taken
into consideration that the decision deals with a contract made in
the spring of 1925. It may-be that an ordinary usage has now been
developed, but further decisions were not reported.
74.

Amtsgericht Halberstadt, November 15, 1926-1931

Archiv ffr Luf-

trecht 225-Translation 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 426 by Professor Zollman.
75. The Chamber of Industry and Commerce thought the lack of any cus-

tom was due to the fact that air transportation companies liked to meet the particular wishes of their patrons as much as possible by making express provisions
in the individual contracts.
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bb. Exhibition.
The legal consequences of the countermand of a stop-over
within an air tour were discussed by the Reichsgericht. 7 6 In July,
1930 the defendant, an aero-club, undertook an airtour over the
Rhineland to commemorate the liberation from the Army of Occupation. They planned to fly to several towns inside the occupied
territory. Plaintiff, an aeroclub in one of these towns, had made
great endeavors toward obtaining such a stop-over for July 5, 1930,
and an agreement had been made the significance of which was
argued in the law suit. Plaintiff had made extended arrangements
when, on July 4th, defendant countermanded the stop-over. The
defendant had appointed a committee to take action upon all preparations, and the Court stated that the members of said committee
had been assistants to the defendant in charge of preparing the air
tour. On July 2, a member of the committee had examined the flying
field and had found out that the field was too small for safety to
the participating planes under the expected traffic rush. Defendant
proposed to restrict the exhibition by stopping only a part of the
planes, but, feeling that such restricted exhibition might jeopardize
his credit, plaintiff had rejected this proposal. He sued the defendant
for compensation of the expenses paid in preparing the stop-over
and a part of the profit lost. The Landgericht rejected the claim for
profits lost but held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation
of expenses. The Oberlandesgericht rejected the appeals of both
parties. Defendant petitioned for a rehearing and the Supreme
Court referred again to the Court of Appeal. The Reichsgericht
held that a contract had been concluded. It agreed with the Court
of Appeal qualifying the contract as being of a special type that
had peculiar features of a contract for work. 77 In reference to the
decision of the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht in 1931 Juristische
Wochenschrift 1934) the Oberaudesgericht explained that each party
had to conduct itself in such a way that it acted according to the
interests of the other and avoided damage to him. It held that the
defendant had been bound to investigate whether the landing field
was fitted for the exhibition before or as soon as said field was
admitted for a stop-over and that forebearing such investigation he
was negligent and liable for such negligence. On the other side
defendant alleged he could rely upon the air police who did not
oppose the planned stop-over. The Supreme Court held that the
76.

March 24, 1933-VII 345/32-1934 Archly fUr Luftrecht 87, annotated

by Haupt.

77. The Court analyses the negotiations stating that there is no contract of
partnership as defendant expressed his opinion. The arguments deal only with
general provisions and have no special interest as problem In air law.
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facts were not sufficiently established to base a decision as to whethe
and at what time defendant was bound to investigate for himself.78
Haupt, annotating the decision of the Reichsgericht, disagreed
because the decision did not make it clear whether defendant was
negligent in failing to fulfill his obligation which involved the execution of a stop-over on plaintiff's airfield. Analyzing the problem
Haupt discussed three possibilities: 1. The performance of the
contract was impossible in an objective sense. 2. The contract was
avoided. 3. Defendant was entitled to rescission because of the
failure of basic assumptions. It may be admitted that the decision
of the Reichsgericht does not seem to scrutinize the problem
exhaustively. If the performance of the contract was impossible
ab initio, the problem had to be examined as to whether, at the time
of the conclusion of the contract, defendant knew or ought to have
known that the performance was impossible, because in that event,
under § 307 German Civil Code, the defendant would be bound.
to make compensation for any damage which plaintiff had sustained
by relying upon the validity of the contract, unless he also knew
or ought to have known the impossibility. Onl the other hand, it is
a doubtful problem whether beyond § 307 a contracting party may
be bound to investigate if the performance is impossible and may
be under an obligation for damages omitting such investigations.
Since the Reichsgericht mentioned neither the impossibility nor the
second problem, and since it stands to reason that the Reichsgericht
did not overlook the problem, it may be assumed that the Supreme
Court held it obvious that a contract to undertake a stop-over is
not impossible to perform because the safety of the traffic is not
guaranteed.
Regarding the other viewpoint in Haupt's annotation, the deci
sion of the Supreme Court contains no remarks. Thus it would
appear that there is no way to determine from this opinion what
legal significance the Reichsgericht gave to the countermand.
e. Admission of aircraft.
The traffic of aircraft within Germany is not permitted7 9 unless
the craft is admitted ° and, as far as airships and aeroplanes are
concerned, is registered. 8 1 The requirements are stated by the Act
and the Air Traffic Ordinance. The procedure is a mere admin78. Also the facts regarding contributory negligence (§ 254 of the German
Civil Code) of the plaintiff were not cleared up.
79. The exception for foreign aircraft is made in § 102 Air Traffic Ordinance:
they may be admitted by International Convention or special permit.
80. § 2 Air Traffic Act.
81. § 3 Air Traffic Act.
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istrative one. Decisions of Courts dealing with problems arising
therefrom are not reported.
3. Airmen.
a. Pilots' and operators' certificates.
Under § 4 Air Traffic Act a certificate of the authority is
required in order to operate aircraft or to participate in such operation. 8 2 According to § 18 Air Traffic Act in the wording of
August 1, 1922, tile legal remedy against decisions of the administrative authorities was given in the way of administrative jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction was exercised by the different countries
and, where a country was lacking administrative jurisdiction, an
appeal was to be filed tinder the regulations of the industrial statute
(Gewerbeordnung). In the amended wording of the Air Traffic
Act of August 21, 1938 the provisions of § 18 are cut out. Until a
general act regarding legal remedy against orders and decrees of
the police of the Reich is enacted, complaints may be filed only with
the authority which, issued the decree. The final decision in such
cases is given by the Minister for Aviation.13 Nevertheless, there
are some earlier decisions of administrative courts that may be of
interest because the points of view regarding the reliability and fitness of airmen will be the same. § 18 I 2 Air Traffic Ordinance in
the wording of July 19, 193084 read as follows: "Facts (viz: that
may make a person unfit for piloting and operating aircraft) are
especially: habitual drunkenness, placing tinder guardianship, loss
of civic rights, and previous convictions for crime, offence or contravention of traffic rules."
aa. The Prussian Oberverwaltungsgericht 3 (Chief Administration Court) held that the enumeration of facts, from which
the inappropriateness follows is not exhaustive but only by way of
example ;86 also, numerous slight punishments may indicate that the
applicant is unfit. In the feeling of the Court, such numerous punishments may justify the conclusion that applicant is not willing
to respect the rights and laws and to accommodate himself to police
orders, and it may be feared that such person will disregard the
regulations for air traffic and hurt other persons thoughtlessly if
not willfully.
82. The classes of airmen who want a license are enumerated by § 12 Air
Traffic Ordinance.
83. § 4 Act of February 1, 1939 (Luftaufsichtsgesetz 1939 A. G. BI. I, 131)
§ 13 Ordinance of same date; see also § 6 Ordinance of April 18, 1934
8nd
(1934 R. G. Bl. 1, 310).
84. Substantially corresponding to § 19 Air Traffic Ordinance in the wording
of August 30, 1936.
85. January 25, 1934-Ti A 19/33-, 1934 Archiv fir Luftrccht 179.
86. The same principle is expressed by the decision quoted note 90.
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bb. The Bavarian Verwaltungsgericht 8 7 held that even contraventions of traffic rules that have not been punished may make
.a person unfit for the certificate and that the decision may be different in as much as contraventions committed by one pilot do not
justify withdrawing the license and the same contraventions committed by another one may do so. If a license is issued to an infant,
-the Court said-extremely correct behaviour has to be requested
because the Air Traffic Act provides the issuance of licenses to
infants8 8 only by way of exception.
cc. The Verwaltungsgericht Bremen5 9 has considered a flyer
as unfit for a license who twice violated the traffic rules. It was also
of some importance to the court that the pilot had committed some
other irregularities, whenever the court admitted that "incautiousness is only the other side of the venturesome spirit that, in flying,
cannot be lacked."
dd. The Prussian Oberverwaltungsgericht 0 held that previous
convictions for offenses that (lid not touch aviation (such as repetition of frauds) may also justify the denial of a license.
b. Position of aircraft captain.
The emergency decrees (Notverordnungen) of June 5, 193191
and October 6, 193192 required a reduction of salaries for employees
in the Civil Service and in certain other enterprises. Plaintiff,
who had beenappointed as an aircraft captain to such an enterprise of public character, contested the amount of the reduction.
The Court 3 had to decide to which position in the government's
civil service, the position of an aircraft captain was analogous. It
held that such captain's professional training could be compared to
that of a first naval engineer (Marineoberingenieur) and his occupation to .that of a sea captain appointed to the administration of
the Reichs waterways. (Seekapitin der Reichswasserstrassenverwaltung.)
c. Air instruction.
Under § 6 Air Traffic Act in the present wording, permission
is required for giving instruction to pilots. This rule applies since
87. May 19, 1933-125 II 32-1934 Archtv fUr Luftrecht 93.
88. Between 17 and 21 years; until the Act of July 29, 1936, It was 19
to 21 years.
89. April 18, 1933-53/33-1934 Archlv fitr Luftrecht 96.
90. September 21, 1933-I11 A. 1. 33-1934 Archiv fUr Luftrecht 92. The
decision of November 10, 1932-I11 A 21/32-1933 Archiv fUr Luftrecht 113 ob-

viously deals with the same applicant. The decision discussed only the formalities of appealing and is obsolete since the jurisdiction of administrative courts
was abolished. See note 83.
91.
1931 R. G. BI. I 279.
92.
1931 R. G. BI. I 537.
93.
Landesarbeitsgericht, Berlin. March 18, 1933-108 S. 2518/32-1934

Archly fiir Luftrecht 39.
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the second amendment act of July 19, 1936. The former regulations
were the following: a permission was required if the instruction
was done as a business; otherwise, there was only an obligation to
give notice to the Authority of such purpose.9 4 The Act does not
give a definition of the conception of air instruction (Schulen). In
a penal case the Landgericlit 5 in Plauen stated that flying in an
airplane that has a second control stick built in and thus enables
another person to touch the stick is the beginning of instruction for
a pilot.
i. General development of the lav of airports.
The lack of special rules for a German air law in the beginning
of aviation has been of disadvantageous consequence for the development of airports. Since the general rules of the German civil law
which were to be applied did not provide for the possibilities and
needs of aviation and since, in the beginning,9 the air law has not
been within the Federal competence, the Administrative Authorities
of the different German States undertook to rule the airport development by individual decrees and regulations. It is understood that
such rules have been of many forms in the different States. The
Air Traffic Act of 1922 has taken the first step towards the unifica-

tion of the law' of airports. § 7 of said act prescribed that the establishment of new airports and the continued operation of existing
ones depended on a joint permit' of the Reichs Government and of
94. § 6 Air Traffic Act wording of August 1, 1922-§ 34 Air Traffic Ordinance wording of July 19, 1930. Since a permission is required today without any
difference, at this place, it will be sufficient to know that the requirement "done as
a business" in § 6 Air Traffic Act was interpreted by the courts in the same sense
as in other German laws. See also below note 187.
95. June 9, 1927-2 Br. 46/27-1928 Zeitschrift ffir Luftrecht 52; Translation 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 427.
96. At that time, in Germany there was scarcely a conception regarding the
coming importance of aviation and airports. When the draft for an Air Traffic
Act, 1913, was read for the first time in the German Reichstag (March 12, 1914Protokolle p. 8045), a representative of the German Government declared: "We
do not know whether after some time a real air navigation enterprise of a larger
range will be developed and whether such enterprise will have any importance as
a transportation undertaking in comparison to the railways." On the other hand,
it was already in 1919 that the Secretary of State for Aviation suggested turning
all airports over to the State [reprint in: von Unruh, Flughafenrecht, p. 23) but
the project was not realized. The first regulation for airports in Europe took
place in France. (Ordinances of October 1, 1920 in connection with the Ordinance
of July 8, 1920-cf. 1920 B. N. A. iii; 4 (1920 B. N. A. 33).] Here, during the
World War, a large number of military flying fields were constructed and they
were now utilized for the purposes of civil aviation, since there was no further
military need of them. (See also Rapport 6.6.1919 ; Decret r~glant les conditions de
passage de ]a Coordination G~n~rale de l'Adronautique au Minisere de la Guerre:
passage de la Coordination Genlrale de l'Aronautique au Minist~re de la Guerre:
1923 Repertoire de l'Adronautique et des Transports Airiens, p. 79, 97.) In 1921,
Italy enacted the first decree dealing with airports (November 19, 1921)-Decreto
del Ministero della Guerra no. 102) and shortly thereafter other European States
followed. In this country the law of airports was left to the States. Generally
the various state, territorial and insular governments were authorized by statute
to establish airports. As far as the States have been given corresponding powers
of self government by constitutional amendment or by statute to local governments ("home-rule" communities), airl)orts may also be established without
special statutory grant. (See: Hubbard, McClintock and Williams, Airports
117 sq.) In Federal Statutes, the establishment of airports is mentioned first by
Section 2 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926. The problem of whether the Federal
Government should participate in the construction, Improvement, development,
operation, or maintenance of a national system of airports is still to be cleared
up. (Cf. Section 302 Sq. Civil Aeronautics Act of 19318.)
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the Authority of the State in which the airport was situated. The
acts under which the permit was to be denied or revoked were provided by § 7 II. A definition of airports was given in the Air Traffic
Ordinance 1930 reading in § 35 I as follows: "Airports are grounds
which by their construction and equipment for take-off and landing
of aircraft are intended to serve public air traffic (public airports)
or special purposes (private airports)." Said definition was dropped
in the new wording of the Air Traffic Ordinance of 1936. But the
classification remained: airports for public air traffic are now called
"traffic airports" and private airports have the denomination "special
airports". (§ 26) Under the present laws there are four groups
of landing areas:
(1). Traffic airports (§ 26 Air Traffic Ordinance 1936-formerly public airports).
Special airports (§ 26 Air Traffic Ordinance-formerly
(2)
private airports).
(3)
Landing places (§ 35 Air Traffic Ordinance-formerly
private landing places).

97

(4) Gliding territories (§ 38 Air Traffic Ordinance-foriner
wording of § 48).
Under the Ordinance of 1930 there was only the obligation to
give notice to the Authority for nos. 3 and 4; under the wording
of 1936 a permit is required for all places.
Under the Air Traffic Act of 1922 airports were described as
the general starting points and destinations of flight; however, without prejudice to emergency, aircraft had the right to land not only
on public or private airports, but also-outside of towns-on land
that was not fenced and on any expanse of water. 8 This rule was
amended by an act of December 19, 1935: Now, in general, aircraft
must land at airports. The right to land outside of airports, for
general traffic, is only countenanced by necessity as far as security
of flight may require or a special permit is granted by the Authority. 99
The airport zone is considered as a part of the airport.' 0 0 The
Air Traffic Ordinances provided further regulations for airports. 10 1
In particular, building zones have been established by the Air Traffic
Ordinance of 1930. Such a zone has been extended by the Ordinance
97.

§ Air Traffic Ordinance 1930-§ 35 Air Traffic Ordinance of 1936 says:

98.
99.

§ 12 Air Traffic Act wording of 1922.
§ 12 Air Traffic Act wording of 1936.

"Landing places are area that serve regularly for take-off and landing of aircraft,
without the particular construction and equipment of airports being required."
100. See § 8 Air Traffic Act-The airport zone is established by the Authority
granting an airport permit. It is not the building zone. Its import is to be found
in the provision of § 5 of the Air Traffic Act-hence it follows that In the limits

of the airport including the airport zone, aircraft may be. operated without admission and by unlicensed airmen.
101. §§ 35-48 wording of 1930; §§ 26-29 wording of 1936.
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of 1936 under the name "building protection zone" (Bauschutzbereich).10 2 The Act of September 27, 1938 repealed the latter rule
and, enacting §§ 10a-h in the Air Traffic Act, established extended
restrictions for the erection of buildings and constructions first in
the surroundings of the airport, and further, outside of such surroundings beyond a certain height. 1° 3 If the permit for constructions
is denied or granted under special requirements, the applicant may
appeal. Such appeal is to be filed according to the general provisions
of Reichs or State law regarding the permit for construction. Decision is to be given by the Administrative Authority with the cooperation of the Ministry for Aviation.
2. Decisions as to the establishment of airports-zoning--expropriation.
a. The municipal corporation Sellin had established a sea aerodrome on the lake of Sellin. Traffic regulations had been enacted
by a decree of the police superintendent July 20, 1938. For decades
the' fishermen in Sellin had had the right to fish in the lake of Sellin.
Exercising such right they had put the stakes for weir-fishing in
such a way that planes taking off or landing on the water had to
cross the row of stakes. 'hus the safety of flight was endangered.
As an airline to Sellin was to be started, the police superintendent
ordered the fishermen to remove the stakes. Upon their refusal to
do so, he did it. A fisherman took legal proceedings to the Administrative Court. He argued that the row of stakes did not endanger
the air traffic. The lower Court °4 held that the ordinance was against
the law and former regulations. The Court pointed out that the
stakes did endanger the air traffic but, since the right of fishing had
been in force before the airport was established, the fishermen had
to be indemnified for said right; in other words: the right of fishing
took priority over the right to use the lake that the municipal corporation of Sellin, the owner of the sea aerodrome, had conceded
102. § 28 Air Traffic Ordinance of 1936. Said provision does not extend to
an expropriation without compensation. The rule involved that the owner of an
airport was informed regarding the intention of neighbors to erect building, etc. in

time; as the laws for building are state laws it depended on the law of the dif-

ferent states whether the permit to build might be denied or the owner had to

settle the case with the neighbor or whether he got th right of expropriation.

103. To the removal of constructions existing at the time, when the Act
of September 27, 1938 came into effect, the general rules regarding expropriation
§ 15 of the Air
for the purpose of aviation are to be applied is provided by Traffic Act. As far as a restriction of rights comes into effect under the said act,
the Minister for Aviation determines a compensation only In certain cases (§10 g).
Such cases are, if an enterprise becomes unprosperous or if the restriction without
compensation would be an unfair hardship. The Act mentions as samples:

a con-

struction which was otherwise permissible and which was to be erected immediately is now to be prohibited or the further utilization for the existent purpose

becomes impossible or more difficult. In all cases the courts have no Jurisdiction.
104. Kreisausschuss des Krelses Rtigen-Decsion of April 24, 1931-1931
Archly flr Luftrecht 152.
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to the airline.' 0 5
The higher Court' 0 6 dismissed the appeal, however, though not
agreeing with the reasoning of the lower Court. It held that the
police superintendent did not have jurisdiction because the lake of
Sellin is part of the Baltic Sea. Otherwise,-the court foundthe problem could not arise under § 44 of the Prussian Ordinance
regarding Fishing, of March 29, 1917/ March 16, 1918 which provides that the stakes are to be removed when the fishing season is
terminated. The Court stated that the fishing season had already
terminated when the air line started, and hence that at this time the
fishermen had to take out the stakes. Therefore, it was held, there
was no need for a police ordinance except that the fishermen did
not perform their duty and any delay would have been dangerous.
In such circumstances, the Court held the extrordinary competence
of the police superintendent was to be established. From this decision it may be inferred that the principle of § 15 of the Air Traffic
Act was not to be applied because the fishermen had no better right
than the air line; therefore, they were not entitled to indemnification.
b. The construction of a high-tension electric line near an airport was disputed in the case of the Boeblingen airport. The
Boeblingen airport (near Stuttgart) is owned by the Reich and
was let on lease to an incorporated company, the Luftverkehr Wi.irttemberg Aktiengesellschaft, which ran airlines and maintained an
air school at this site.'1 7 It had partly subleased to other air enterprises. In 1926 an electric power plant, the Grosskraftwerk W-iirttemberg A. G. (called Growag) had obtained the right for expropriation for the construction of a high-tension line. It had acquired the
right to erect masts from the owners of land. In 1927 it had filed
an application to the police for a special form of permit called a
"Polizeiliches Erkenntnis" that was required under the law of the
state of Wirttemberg.' 08 Before such permit was issued by the
police authority, the Growag had started the construction of the
line, since the police had permitted certain preparatory work to be
undertaken. In July 1929 the part of the line that is of interest here,
had been completed. It went along the airport at a distance of
1350-2400 meters (about 4460-7873 feet) over poles of a height of
35-40 meters (about 115-131 feet). It did not project into the line
of flight, i. e. under the German provisions an angle of 1 -- 15
105. The decision does not say in what way the indemnification had to be
undertaken. As far as an agreement was not to be reached, there would have been
only the expropriation under § 15 Air Traffic Act.
106. Bezirksausschuss Stralsund July 17, 1931-I B 3/31 1931 Archly fUr
Luftrecht 269.
107. In 1928 the airport had been used for 74,832 take-offs and landings.
108. See n. 110 infra.
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measured from the end of the landing ground. Subsequently the
"Polizeiliche Erkenntnis" was denied. The Administrative Court of
Wfirttemberg' 019 dismissed the appeal. Regarding the police permit
the court pointed out that the law of the State of W.irttemberg
required a so-called "Polizeiliches Erkenntnis" for the construction
and the management of a high tension line, if the line had to go over
public ways and waters1" but, that the required "Erkenntnis" did
not mean that the police a.uthority granted a permit to operate such
a line. In this sense-the Court found-a permit was not to be
required because the principle of freedom of trade was to be applied,
which means that construction and management of high-tension lines
is generally allowed without a permit or license, unless a special rule
required such a permit. The Court held that the "Erkenntnis" had
only the meaning that the police did not object to the construction and
that from the denial of the "Erkenntnis," it was to be concluded
that the police declined to tolerate the construction and that the
entrel)reneur had to remove the construction. The Court held that,
for the Growag, this included a restriction of the property and of the
right of use. The problem was whether such restriction was to be
permitted. As the Court established, in the State of Wiirttemberg, it
was customary that in virtue of the police power based upon the
general executive power and within the jurisdiction of the public
administration and under the Reichs and State laws, the police were
entitled to protect necessary order in reference to the needs of the
population. The Court discussed the constitutionality of said custom t1 1 and pointed out that it affected neither the principle of personal freedom"1 2 nor of protection of property" 8 nor the principle
114
of freedom of trade.
Regarding the problem in itself, the decision depended on
whether the high-tension line endangered the air traffic and by that
also the life and health of persons participating in flight. Several
experts were of the opinion that this was so and the Court followed
1 15
them in its decision.
109.'

Irttemlbergischer

Verwaltungsgerichtshof

1929-1931 Archly fOr Luftrecht 248..

Stuttgart,

December

110.
Ordinance of the Minister of the Interior of Wiirttemberg
1913/July 5, 1926. The reason for such regulation is to be found in the
that, whenever public ways and waters are free for common use, the
high tension line is really exceeding the common use.
111.. The problem is of general Importance but as yet there is no

interest from the view point of air law.
112.
113.
114.

115.

23,

April 21,
viewpoint
use for a
particular

Art. 114 German Constitution of 1919.
Art. 153 II German Constitution of 1919.
§ 1 Gewerbe Ordnung. (Industrial Code.)

The Court disapproved the opinion of other experts stating that there

was no risk for airplanes caused by the construction of the high tension line.
The Court adopted the opinion of experts who held that the high tension line was
dangerous for flight for the following reasons: The grounds crossed by the line
were covered with hills and forests and, since winds from the west and south-

west prevailed, -weather disadvantageous for flight often set in, particularly fog,
clouds and air eddies. Under such atmospheric conditions, the discernibility of the
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The Court said that the fact that the high tension line was
outside of the line of flight was irrelevant. In the case in question
the rules providing an airport zone 1
1511 6 was not sufficient to
guarantee safety for air traffic. Hence, the Court held the denial of
the permit had been correct. It disavowed that said denial was not
against § 15 Air Traffic Act which, under certain circumstances,
provides the possibility of expropriating property or other rights over
17
land.'
It may be remembered that, at this time, the Air Traffic Ordinance had not yet been enacted; the Court had to consider the matter
from the viewpoint of administration. The requirements of Reichs
Ministry of Communications regarding airport zoning were not
law, but only guiding rules. The Court objected to the idea that,
from the viewpoint of the police competence, constructions outside
the angle 1 - 15 near an airport were not to be deemed dangerous to
flight, because tile ministry only required an airport zone 1 - 15.
It stated that constructions in the area closely surrounding an
airport might also be dangerous to flight though they did not project
into the airport zone, and that said constructions might be contrary
to the general order which the police had to maintain. The Administrative Court described the problem as one of airport zoning, but
in our view, it is one of building zones (building protection zone)."'
Regarding the interpretation of the Air Traffic Act it follows from
the decision of the Administrative Court that the expropriation
provided by § 15 Air Traffic Act" 9 does not prevent the administrative authority's prohibiting of a plant, even though such prohibition
in its effects amounts to an expropriation. When the said decision
had become final the Growag shifted the high tension line. It sued
the lessees of the airport for the shifting expenses and for loss of
profit during the time the work was going on. The dismissal of the
suit was approved by the Supreme Court'O ° which stated the following principles: A claim for indemnification might be enforced under
line and the climbing speed of the aircraft were affected and the craft might collde with the line. Furthermore, it was considered that the line was inconvenient
for emergency landings and besides all this, it might have upset unskilled pilbts
and student pilots and increased the risk of collision.
116. At the time in consideration such rule was established for the construction of airports by the Federal Ministry of Communications; today, see § 8
Air Traffic Act, § 27 Air Traffic Ordinance.
117. See note below 121.
1t8. Said zone was enacted later by § 37 Air Traffic Ordinance (§ 28 new
wording) now §§ 10 a-g Air Traffic Act in the wording of tTie Act of September
27, 1938, as previously mentioned. See also note 103. Besides the latter regulation, the construction of hightension lines is ruled by the Act of December 13,
1935 (Energiewirtschafts Gesetz 1935 R. G. B1. I 1451) ; § 4 of said act provides
that the Reichs Minister of Economy is entitled to object to construction, renewal, enlargement or shifting of power plants and to forbid them for common
good.
119. See also decision of Reichsgericht note 120.
120. Decision February 27, 1932, - V. 279/31-1932 Archly flr Luftrecht
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§ 15 Air Traffic Act' 2l only if legal proceedings for expropriation are
carried on; but, if such expropriation had taken place only the
entrepreneur of the airport would have been bound for compensation, the lessees and sublessees not at all.
Under Art. 153 II German Constitution a party would not be
entitled to indemnification unless it were deprived of or restricted
from a subjective personal right in favor of a third party by the
exercise of power of eminent domain that had been applied against
a certain individual or a circle of certain individuals. 1'2 ' But, as the
Reichsgericht pointed out, since the permit was denied not for the
protection of the defendant but for the protection of the community,in order to preserve life and health of the population and in particular of all those who are involved in air traffic,' 2 3 -the State would
12 4
be liable for the indemnification.
The Supreme Court held that also § 1027 German Civil Code
was not to be applied. Plaintiff had acquired the right to have poles
for the high tension line on the land of other owners by real servitudes. § 1027 German Civil Code provides that the party entitled
to the servitude has the rights specified in § 1004 German Civil Code,
if its real servitude is interfered with. It follows therefrom that,
without proof of negligence or malice, the party which is disturbed
in the use of its real servitude (by interferences from a plant serving business or public purposes) may have a claim for damages as
far as it is not entitled to oppose the encroachment. But, as the
Supreme Court stated, the interference was not caused by the
defendant but was due to the intervention of the police. In addition, the Court remarked that flying over the servient tenement

does not encroach upon the real servitude and that, besides this,
flight over another's land is free under § 1 Air Traffic Act.
Regarding the attitude of the entrepreneur of the airport the
German Supreme Court held that he was entitled to make application to the police in reference to the endangerment caused by the
high tension line and that he was under no obligation at all against
the Growag to call attention to the requirement of another trace for
the high tension line since there was no legal connection between the
Growvag and the entrepreneur. The Court declared that the entre121. § 15 Air Traffic Act provides that in case of public requirements for the
purposes of air navigation, property and other rights over land may be deprived
or restricted for adequate indemnification if an agreement is not to be attained
between entrepreneur and owner.
122. Such principle is in accordance with numerous decisions of 109 RGZ.
319; 111 RGZ. 130; 129 RGZ. 148.
123.
The Reichsgericht followed the opinion of the Wilrttembergischen
Verwaltungsgerichtshof-see note 109.
124.
See 80 RGZ. 305; 82 RGZ. 81; the entrepreneur of the airport would
have been liable in so far as the permit would have been denied only for its
interest.
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preneur could depend upon the police and trust that the latter would
take appropriate action in time, especially since the plaintiff was able
to realize that the planned line brought a risk to air traffic. Hence,
the Court refused to apply the provisions of § 826 of the German
Civil Code.

1 25

As mentioned above, the Act of September 27, 1938 enacted
new regulations regarding a building protection zone. Under the
said act the legal situation would be as follows: If, after the act came
into force, plaintiff would have constructed the high tension line
before a permit was granted, lie would be deemed to be a party
which has the intention of constructing the line. An indemnification
would be stipulated by the Minister of Aviation if he found that the
restriction of plaintiff's rights without indemnification would be an
unfair hardship. Such indemnification would be paid by the entrepreneur of the airport. The courts would have no jurisdiction. If
the line were established when the act came into force, and if a
permit for the construction were required by the former regulations,
there would be no difference from the former legal situation. If the
permit were required only by the new regulation or if the construction were in existence before the permit for the establishment of the
airport was issued, the general rules providing expropriation would
be applied (§ 101 Air Traffic Act, wording of September 27, 1938).
Such general rule will be found first in § 15 Air Traffic Act. The
relation of the said rules to Art. 153 II German Constitution providing an indemnification for expropriation has not been the object of
decisions as yet.'

26

3. Use of Airports
a. Use of airport for take-off and landing.
The problem of whether the entrepreneur of a public airport' 2 7
might be entitled to prohibit a pilot from entering upon an airport and
taking off and landing on it appeared in 1932. The city of Krefeld
owned an airport and operated it subject to certain airport regulations
125.

Under § 826 German Civil Code a person who willfully causes damage

contra bonos mores is bound to compensation. It may be called into question
whether the Supreme court would give the same reasons regarding § 826 today as
far as it said that the entrepreneur was not bound to call upon plaintiff before
the construction was started. Since the seizure of governmental power by the
National Socialistic Regime in 1933, German jurisprudence emphasizes the principle that common welfare precedes the welfare of the individual; it follows from
said principle that the individual has to take care of the interests of the community and it might be that under such principle the entrepreneur had to call the
plaintiff's attention to the risk of the proposed trace. But, on the other hand,
perhaps also today the same decision should be based upon the fact that the
plaintiff was able to realize the risk of the proposed trace and that the entrepreneur had done nothing from which the plaintiff could think there was no risk
at all.
126. Amendments of the Constitution required a specific majority; Art. 76.
127. Now traffic airport.
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which had been approved by tie competent ministry.' 8 In consequence of some quarrels between the plaintiff and the superintendent
of the airport and a deputy-mayor of the city of Krefeld, the latter
had prohibited him from entering upon the airport. Plaintiff desired
to use the airport for taking off and landing an airplane whose
owner had commissioned him to make test flights. Since he was
not admitted to the airport he applied for an injunction against the
city of Krefeld to be allowed to use it. The lower Court (Landgericht) in Krefeld held that plaintiff's behavior during the before
mentioned quarrels justified the prohibition and dismissed the case.
The Court of Appeal 12 9 rejected plaintiff's appeal after, in the
meantime, the commission for test flights had been withdrawn. The
decision of the Court of Appeal was based upon the lack of formal
requirements provided by the German Code of Procedure1 30 and
therefore, nothing may be concluded from it regarding the problem
itself.
Meanwhile, in the month of March, 1932, plaintiff secured
another commission for test flights and he was again excluded from
the airport. He applied for an injunction. At this time, the lower
Court ordered on March 23, 19321s' as follows: "On pain of a fine
to be stipulated in any case of contravention, defendant is prohibited
to prevent the plaintiff from entering upon the airport KrefeldBockum for the purpose of flying and to expel him from the airport,
if he is prepared to take off, to land or to check an airplane as long
as plaintiff has conlplied with the general requirements for the use
of airports and with the particular requirements of the defendant
(fees, license, certificate, insurance policy and so on)."
In compliance with this injunction, the plaintiff was admitted
to the airport but, during a thunderstorm, the defendant denied
permission to the plaintiff to use a hangar. On plaintiff's application
for another injunction on April 1, 1932, the lower Court denied the
defendant's right to prevent the plaintiff from using the hangars
if he had complied with the general and particular provisions for such
use. The defendant's objection failed; the lower Court upheld the
128.

The facts of the case are to be found partly in the decision of the Ober-

landesgericht Disseldorf of Jan- 10

1933-9 U 268/32-1933 Archly filr Luftrecht

99, and partly in an annotation by br. von Unruh 1. c.
129. Oberlandesgericht DUsseldorf, April 19, 1932-9 W74a/32-Decislon
not reported; mentioned by von Unruh 1933 Archiv ftir Luftrecht 102.
130. The German Code of Procedure (§8 936, 940) provides that an injunction for a provisional arrangement of a law case is only to be issued if plaintiff
has a sufficient interest as defined by the Code for a provisional arrangement.
Such interest had been wanting at the time the commission was canceled since,
besides said commission, plaintiff had no particular interest for provisional
arrangement.
131. Landgerlclt Krefeld. Quoted from the above-mentioned annotation
by von Unruh.
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decisions; defendant's appeal was dismissed by the Oberlandesgericht
1 32
as Court of Appeal.
The decision is of particular interest since it is the first and
only case dealing with the entrepreneur of a traffic airport's right to
prevent a pilot from using the airport for flying purposes.
The first problem to be decided was a formal one: whether or
not the courts have jurisdiction. In discussing this problem, the Court
of Appeal stated that the plaintiff had been interested in entering
the airport only for the purpose of taking off and landing and
sheltering the plane in a hangar insofar as that was absolutely
necessary for flight. The Court pointed out that, under § 91 Air
Traffic Ordinance 1930,133 the police had jurisdiction over air
traffic on the landing grounds.' 34 Hence, insofar as the police
would have inhibited him from the use of the airport, the courts
would have no jurisdiction. However-as the court stated-the
police had not interfered, but that had been done by the owner and
operator of the airport', the City of Krefeld. If at all, the Court
pointed out, the city had no other motive to vindicate the prohibition
of the airport's use than in relying on its ownership. The problem
to be decided by the Court was, whether the right of ownership
entitled the owner of a traffic airport to prevent a person from
entering it. The Coirt stated that such problem was one of the
civil law and under its jurisdiction. The Court found that the City
of Krefeld operated a public airport (§ 7 Air Traffic Act; § 35
Air Traffic Ordinance) and that it had dedicated said airport to the
common use.1 3 5 The Court held that the dedication to common use
meant that every pilot was entitled to take-off and land under the
provisions approved by the authority, and that-if plaintiff were
willing to comply with the provisions and regulations-the defendant
could prevent him from entering the airport only under special
circumstances. For the Court, such special circumstances would be
such as involve special inconveniences. Examining the different
disputes and especially the actions of the plaintiff, the Court denied
that defendant could reasonably deduce from those facts that the
plaintiff would give special inconvenience.' 36 Finally, the Court
132. Oberlandesgericht Diisseldorf, January 10, 1933 (1933 Archiv fr
Luftrecht 99).
133. § 34 Air Traffic Ordinance 1936 says that the Air Board (Luftamt) has
to rule the airport. Regarding -the start see § 94 Air Traffic Ordinance 1936

or
which requires the permission of the Airport Authority (Flughafenleitung)
Air Police Station (Luftaufsichtswache).
§ 91 Air Traffic Act gives no provisions regarding other parts of the
134.

airport.
"Zum Gemeingebrauch gewidmet."
Defendant reproached the plaintiff with the following grievances:
a.
i)efendant maintained that plaintiff, as manager of a company residing in.the airport building had committed fraud to his prejudice. The Court
said that there was no connection between the case in question and the
135.
136.
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held defendant had acted contra bonos mores 13 7 if, due to previous
disputes in connection with other contracts, he rendered it impossible to plaintiff, who depended upon the use of the said airport, to
carry on his profession.
The problem in question is not solved by a special regulation
of the Air Traffic Act and Ordinances, but the decision is based
upon general principles. It may, however, be open to some
doubt whether the reported decision discusses the case exhaustively
enough to be a precedent for similar cases.
The Oberlaudesgericht dealt with the case solely from the
standpoint of the civil law. The same Court said in the abovementioned decision of April 19, 193213 s , "The problem of the use
of an airport by agents of an airplane operator is not a problem of a
subjective public right' 39 but of the private law, especially of the
law of ownership. The right to expel persons who are undesired
is only based upon the private right of ownership. The Court has
jurisdiction." If the l)oint of view of the Court of Appeal has
been correct, there is no doubt that the Court had jurisdiction.
Actually, the Court of Appeal discussed only the right of the defendant. From § 903 German Civil Code 140 it follows that the owner
is entitled to prohibit the use of his property, but, as the Court said,
by dedicating the airport to public traffic (and, it may be added,
by opening it to such traffic) the defendant had restricted his rights
resulting from ownership, so that, on principle, he was bound to
admit every flyer. But the restriction of the rights of ownership
is not a complete one, as the Court said; it is confined to uses that
give no inconvenience. If the use of the airport causes special
inconveniences, the defendant might use his rights as owner. It may
be directed whether the decision was founded on this principle
alone, for if the.plaintiff asserted the right of entering on the airport, the first problem was what right existed and whether it was
well-founded. From here the problem of whether the court had
jurisdiction had to start, and in reference to the rights of the
alleged fraud.

b. After several disputes regarding the rented rooms in the airport
building, plaintiff had entered the real estate of defendant unlawfully. Here,

also, the Court did not find a reasonable connection with the case before It,
and added that plaintiff's defense that he believed he was entitled to enter,

had not been refutable.
c. A threat and an insult against defendant's employees that had no
importance in the feeling of the Court, pointing out that also the demeanor of
these employees had not been perfectly correct.
137. § 826 German Civil Code.
138. Quoted from von Unruh 1. c.
139. Subjektives 6ffentliches Recht.
140 § 903 German Civil Code reads as follows: "The owner of a thing
may, in so far as the law or the rights of third parties admit, deal with the thing
as he leases and exclude others from any interference with it." (Chung Hui
Wang. F
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plaintiff the legal position of the defendant had to be examined.
To find out what rights plaintiff might have, the position of the
entrepreneur of a traffic airport and of its patrons was to be
examined. Originally, as mentioned above, the Air Traffic Act
required only a permit for the establishment or continued operation
of an airport. The provision that an airport was not to be opened
before it was rated, and the regulations for its use had been
approved, was introduced by § 42 of the Air Traffic Ordinance of
July 19, 1930. The German writers 141 concluded from said provisions that it was not a concession' 42 in the sense of a privilege
but only a police permit, 14' and that such permit covered a dedication for the common use of air traffic. From such dedication a
subjective public right to use the airport extends to patrons. Also,
if the suit was based upon such subjective public right, the case fell
within the Court's jurisdiction. It is a well established rule in the
decisions of the Reichsgericht 44 that the courts have jurisdiction in
suits concerning the defendant's right to interfere with the plaintiff's subjective public right to enter on a way dedicated for public
use.
The further problem,-what rights did reimain to the owner,was left open by the Court which said that, if at all, only special
circumstances would give a right to the owner and explaining that
such circumstances had not been evident.
Recently German writers 14" dealing with the problem more as
a whole, and taking into consideration as well the establishment
as the permit to operate the airport, held it to be a real concession' 46
and regarded the airport as an institution under public law. From
this point of view the owner has no right to forbid a patron to enter
the airport, and also, the opinion of the Court of Appeal in Diisseldorf that the owner may be entitled to an injunction under special
circumstances might be called into question as far as the Court
derived such right from the private ownership. From the viewpoint of public law the only way would be that the police proceed
against patrons which act contrary to police regulations.1 4 7 Coercion
of the police is to be employed only by the Airport Authority. For
141. Schleicher Luftverkehrsgesetz p. 59, § 7, 3; Bredow-Mdiiler, Luftverkehragesetz p. 135, J 7 C II; Wegerdt, 1932 Archly ftir Luftrecht 50.
142. "Verleihung".
143. "Polizeierlaubnis" that is similar to a certificate.
144. 123 R.G.Z. 181 and often.
145. Ewalt Schenk, Flughafen p. 28; von Unruh, Flughafenrecht, p. 51;
Koffka-Bodenstein-Koffka, Luftverkehrsgesetz, p. 49, § 7, V.; Schleicher-Reymann, Recht der Luftfahrt p. 87, § 7, 2.
146. Echte Konzession.
147. von Unruh, 1933 Archiv f(Ir Luftrecht 106, expresses the opinion that
the owner may be entitled by his private right of ownership to Prevent patrons
from a use against the regulations by a claim for damages or other means, but
on no condition by the negatoria.
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the Air Traffic Ordinance of 1930 this may be deduced from § 91
reading as follows: "It is the task of the police to regulate the traffic
on the landing ground of a public airport in order to protect public
safety and order." Under the Air Traffic Ordinance of 1936 there
is no difference. From § 34 Air Traffic Ordinance 1936 and §
10 Appendix to §§ 26-34 Air Traffic Ordinance (Regulations for
establishment and management of airports) the conclusion may be
drawn that the law distinguishes between the entrepreneur and the
Airport Authority. The Airport Authority's director is a civil servant
of the German Reich. 148 In support of the above-mentioned decision
of the Court of Appeal in Diisseldorf Professor von Unruh found still
1 49
other arguments which may be quoted. Professor von Unruh
agrees with the Court of Appeal that defendant was not entitled to
prevent the plaintiff from using the airport. But he gives another
reasoning: The airport regulations, approved by the authority provide
the use of the traffic airport for take-offs and landings, and these
regulations are, in a way, special rules1 50 which the entrepreneur
is bound to observe. If the entrepreneur prevents a pilot, who has
complied with the provisions and regulations, from using the airport, he infringes the airport regulations. Such infringement means
that he operates the airport contrary to the conditions imposed by
the Authority, and he is thus culpable under § 32, no. 5 Air Traffic
Act. Said provision is intended to protect others in the meaning of
§ 823 11 German Civil Code and therefore, a person damaged by
such infringement is entitled to forbearance. Such claim in tort
are under the jurisdiction of the Courts.
b.

Airport charges.
The fees that an airport may charge for its use are established
by the airport regulations approved by the Authority. In tile few
cases which were reported, the German Courts have adjudicated the
airport fees ol the ground that a contract under private law has been
concluded by which the flyer was entitled to use the airport for a
monetary consideration. In two decisions';" the courts said: "The
person who uses an airport accepts impliedly the offer of the entrepreneur to permit the use of the airport in return for payment of the
fee established by the tariff." Moreover, the judgment of the
Court in Breslau emphasizes that the tariff had been posted at the
148. The right to use an airport is developed as a public right in several
European countries as Italy, France, Poland, Portugal, etc. ; whereas in the
U. S. A. it is ruled only by regulations of private enterprises.
149. Flughafeurecht pp. 59, 60 note 90 ; approving Koffka-BodensteinKoffka, Luftvcrkchrsrccht p. 50, V 1 b.
150. von Unruh refers to the private bill in England.
151. Arntsgericht Berlin-Slitte May 19, 1931-66 C1249/30-1934 Archiv
for Luftrecht 104; Anitsgericht Breslau June 13, 1933-1934 Archly fUr Luftrecht 105.
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airport, and further that the Association of Airport Entrepreneurs
had approved it. But the Court did not explain what legal conclusions were to be drawn from those facts. It seems the Court wished
to express that defendant could neither object to the reasonableness
of the amount nor urge that he had not known the tariff, since he
had had the opportunity to take notice of it. However, the problem
of whether, and in what way, a contract had been concluded would
not arise if the right to use an airport were considered a public right.
If the airport is to be used under public law, the construction of a
contract under private law would be, at least, superfluous. The
German writers disagree.' 5 2 Schleicher-Reymann, 153 though feeling
that the airport is a public institution says that the fees are owed
under private law and are to be enforced as a private claim. Von
Unruh 15 4 and Koffka-Bodenstein-Koffka' 5 5 point out that the
entrepreneur is entitled to the fees under public law. Such title
under public law means that the obligation to pay the fees becomes existent immediately upon using the airport, quite apart
from any contract. 1 6 From this point of view, the reasons of the
two judgments would not be correct. In addition, the problem
seems to be more a theoretical one. Certainly, the Court would be
able to declare that the tariff is contra bonos mores if it found that
the entrepreneur had been unfair in fixing the fees, and was misusing
157
his monopoly. Since each tariff was approved by the Authority,
this seems a mere theoretical possibility. There is little probability
that a German Court would hold a tariff approved by the Authority
to be contra bonos mores. Also, if the fees for the use of an
airport are based upon public law, the courts will have jurisdiction.
It is a well established rule by the Supreme Court' 58 that the courts
may have jurisdiction regarding subjective rights based upon public
law insofar as there is no special rule denying such jurisdiction.
In Germany'5 9 such special regulation is not established concerning
airport fees. The further requirement would be that it is an action
152. Writers who find that the use of an airport is based upon the private
law consistently have to assume the conclusion of a contract.
153.
154.
155.

Recht der Luftfahrt, p. 87, § 7, 2-p.
186, § 31, 1.
Lufthafenrecht, p. .61; ident 1934 Archiv ftir Luftrecht 106.
Luftverkehrsrecht, p. 50, § 7, V, lb.

156. In Germany the fees fixed by the tariff generally are raised only from
flyers who use the airport occasionally. Flyers who use an airport regularly
generally make agreements with the entrepreneur, often an usufructuary lease,
(for instance Deutsche Luft Hansa). By such agreements a lump sum is usually
fixed or the flyer gets the use at a reduced price, or, sometimes, the tariff fees
are stipulated. The German doctrine agrees that a private fee may be stipulated instead of a fee owed under public law (von Unruh, I. c. and 69). Schenk.
Flughafen p. 44 thinks that such agreement is also based upon public law.
157.
§ 42 II Air Traffic Ordinance.
158 67 RGZ. 350; 91 RGZ. 251; 105 RGZ. 37.
159. The regulation of such countries which have adopted the principle of
state airports, provide that the fees are generally collected under the rules for
the collection of taxes due to the State. (c. g. Italy Art. 20, 32 Ordinance. of
March 2, 1933).
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in civil matters;160 the Supreme Court stated' 61 that also a claim
based upon public laws may be an action in civil matters if the right
or the legal position of a person is the object of the dispute.
c.

Airport taxation.

The Air Traffic Act has no rules regarding the taxation of airports and such general rules are also lacking in the finance bills.
Therefore, regarding the different rates and taxes, general principles as to airports are not to be found in German decisions. The legal
position of the airports may be different tinder the different finance
bills and, the position must be examined in reference to the different
regulations. An exhaustive account of airport taxation, in reference
to the numerous acts and regulations and to the numerous changes
of legislation is not possible within the limits of this paper. Therefore, without any claim to completeness, reference is made only to
some decisions which are perhaps characteristic for the point of
view that Tax Courts had in respect to the development. Concerning the imposition of different taxes, 162 it is of importance to
investigate whether an airport is a business undertaking' 63 or
whether it serves public utility. 164 As Professor von Unruh' 6 5
observed, the public airport enterprises generally are operated by partnerships with limited liability or corporations. Members are mostly
the Reich, city communities and other public associations. There are
airport enterprise statutes' 6 which provide that aerial transportation companies and airplane factories are excluded from membership.
Mostly, statutes established that the enterprise serves for public
utility; other statutes provided that net profits are to be placed in
a reserve fund up to a certain amount and that the surplus is to be
used to serve public purposes by promoting airport development or
public air traffic.
Regarding the corporation profits tax'6 7 the Reichsfinanzhof'" S
expressed the view that the aim of a corporation to promote the air
traffic was sufficient to regard it as a public utility. The turnover
tax'6 9 is not to be levied provided that the enterprise is of public
utility and, in addition, that the turnover serves for public utility
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Btirgerlichrechtliche Streitigkcit.
See note 158.
Umsatzsteuer.
Gewerblicher Charakter.
Gemeinntitziger Charakter.

165.

Plughafenrecht, p. 75.

166. As quoted by von Unruh, Flughafenrecht, p. 77 note 122 Berlin, EssenMtihlheim, Stettln. Regarding military pensions, the Reichsversorgungsgericht
(decision of December 16, 1929-M 33004/28-9-1930 Juristische Wochenschrift
1999) held that payments made by the airport company of Stettin came from
public means.

167. K/rperschaftssteuer.
168. Highest German Tax court. Decision of October 23, 1928-I A 549/28
-quoted by the decision of August 22, 1930. See note 170.
169. Umsatzsteuer.
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immediately and, further, the fees are less than those charged on an
average by similar trading associations. In a case of the Bremen
airport the Reichsfinanzhof 170 denied the exemption from the
turnover tax because the tariff of the airport was fixed by the association of airport enterprises, and was exercised by all members of said
association whose enterprises were partly not for public utility.
The Court was satisfied with this finding and abstained from an
analysis of the charges fixed by'the tariff. Two years later the same
Court 17 1 approved a decision of the lower Court that the turnover

tax was not to be levied. The lower Court found that the airport
company had placed its grounds and plants at the disposal of all
flyers and aeronauts without discrimination. It concluded from this
that considerably higher fees ought to be charged if it was for the
purpose of making a profit but the fees fixed by the tariff were
lower than the standard charges. Regarding the lower charges the
Reichsfinanzhof pointed out that the fact alone that an enterprise
requires subsidies does not show that the charges are below the
standard. However, under particular circumstances, as the Court
held, it might be concluded from such prices that the enterprise was
non-profit making, particularly since it made well-planned sacrifices
for public utility without any prospect of future profit. The Reichsfinanzhof in other decisions also admitted that airports serve public
utility. 172 The problem of land taxes 178 was later adjusted by the
Act of December 1, 1930174 which provided that the part of the

airport grounds that is not covered with buildings is free of land
tax.
The question of whether landing grounds are "public places"
for the real estate purchase tax

175

was denied by the Reichsfinanzhof

in a decision of February 14, 1928.
c.

Aviation Enterprises-Air Route Traffic (Scheduled Airlines)
-Aviation Affairs.
1. Requirements of certificates (permits).
§ 11 par. 1 and 2 of the Air Traffic Act reads as follows:
111.

170.
171.

Decision of August 22, 1930-A 346/30-1933 Archlv fUr Luftrecht 110.
Decision of September 16, 1932-A 909/31-1933 Archiv fUr Luftrecht

172.

Decisions December 20, 1929-1930 Reichssteuerblatt 140; October 16

1930-1931 Reichssteuerblatt 858.

Both deal with the Act of Aug. 36, 1924, April

15, 1930 (Aufbringungsgesetz). Former decisions said partly the contrary. In
Switzerland the Public utility of the airport at Basle was denied for the stamp
tax V Archly fUr Schweiz. Abgabenrecht 207, VI id 115.
173. See decision of Prussian Supreme Administrative Court of January 5,
1932-1932

Archly fUr Luftrecht 322-regarding the Prussian municipality

(Kommunalabgabengesetz

of

tax

1893).

174.
Emergency Ordinance of Dec. 1, 1930 (Notverordnung) 1930 R.G.B.1.
I 517, Part III Chapter II § 3 No. 3.
175.
Grunderwerbssteuergesetz-Decision 1I A 51/28, 1928 Stuer und Wirtschaft Nr. 285.
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(1) "For enterprises which, as a business 176 carry persons
or property by aircraft (aviation enterprises) 1 77 and for public
affairs for competition or display in which aircraft take part
(aviation affairs)'a7 a certificate is needed."
(2) "The certificate shall be denied if there is no necessity or if
there are known facts that the public safety or order might be
endangered; if such facts arise later the certificate shall be revoked.
The certificate may be denied if the entrepreneur uses aircraft not
registered as his own in the aircraft register, 179 it may be revoked if
aircraft are not operated for more than a year."' 80 The report on
the draft of the Air Traffic Act pointed out that aviation enterprises must be subjected to the need of a certificate (permit) lest
they prevent a suitable development of air traffic by desultory competition. It was by the exigency of rating that the Reich got the
legal background for its traffic policy. The development of the air
traffic brought on a considerable unification of aviation. At this
time in Germany only the Deutsche Lufthansa and the Deutsche
Zeppelinreederei may come into the question as professional air
traffic. Both are private corporations but under the authoritative
influence of the Reich.' 8 Usually the certificate has been connected
with certain conditions and burdens. Until the Air Traffic Ordinance
was enacted, the development of such provisions rested solely with
the discretion of the authorities of the different States. Regarding
the certificate for aviation enterprises it became an established rule to
make a reservation for the permission of scheduled air route traffic.
Such rule of the administrative authority passed into law enacting
§ 54 Air Traffic Ordinance (wording 1930) which, in addition to the
general certificate, provides special permits for each line of flight in
scheduled air route traffic. The lawfulness of requiring such special
permit has been deduced from § 11 Air Traffic Act which prescribes
that in issuing the certificate the Authority has to examine the need of
the enterprise. § 54 Air Traffic Ordinance (wording 1930) referred
explicitly to § 11 Air Traffic Act. Under the amended Air Traffic
Ordinance' 8 2 the grant of a special permit for scheduled air route
traffic lies in the absolute discretion of the Authority. 83 Court
decisions dealing with aviation enterprises, air route traffic and
176.
"Gewerblich". The former wording was "gewerbsmiLssig". The two
words have the same meaning.
177. Luftfahrtunternehmen.
178. Luftfahrtveraustaltungen.
179. Luftfahrzeugrolle.
180. The permit is partly a license, partly a certificate in the sense of the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
181. Gemischtwirtschaftliche Betriebe.
182. § 42, wording of 1936.
183. Regarding aviation enterprises, the provisions have not changed: also
under § 41 Air Traffic Ordinance (wording 1936) a certificate has to be Issued
if there are no general doubts and if there is a need.
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aviation affairs are only reported in criminal cases since, under
§ 32 nr. 5 Air Traffic Act, a person who operates an aviation enterprise or aviation affair without certificate or contrary to the conditions
incurs a penalty. In the cases that have been reported, the Courts
have dealt with the definition of the terms "aviation enterprise,"
"air route traffic" and "aviation affair," and the meaning and effect
of a granted permit.
2. Definitions of aviation enterprises and air route traffic in
German cases.
a. Aviation enterprises and circular flights as business.
aa. The Landgericht Plauen'8 4 had to decide the criminal case
of a pilot who, without the certificate required by § 11 Air Traffic Act
for aviation enterprises, undertook circular flights. 18 5 The Court explained that an enterprise "refers to a business undertaking, an
activity which is prolonged and done for the purpose of gain, and.
is not for the purpose of promoting art or science," and that "it
is not necessary that the business be very extensive or according to
a fixed schedule.' 8 The Court found that "defendant for months
undertook each week a certain number of daily circular flights with
passengers." The Court decided the undertaking of circular flights,
in which passengers start and land at the same place, was an aviation
enterprise, but gave no reasons for such interpretation. Defendant
particularly raised the point that since he was charging only a fee
covering the actual cost of the flight without profit the flights were
gratuitous (aus Gefidlligkeit), but the Court said that defendant's
actions were to be brought under the designation of a business.
The Court stated that the very purpose of the defendant was
business, and did not believe that the compensations collected in
each case were merely taken to cover the expenses, since a witness
stated that the compensation was to cover the costs of material,
depreciation and value of time consumed. From the fact that the
compensation was nearly -as high as the amount charged by the
Deutsche Lufthansa for similar flights, and from defendant's statement that he acted merely in order to minimize the expenses resulting
from the entire operation of his plane in all of its forms, the Court
deduced that the compensation was not limited to the cost, and that
time and material were not given without compensation. For what
purposes defendant used the money, whether for his own support,
184. Straftkammer (Criminal section) of the Landgericht Plauen, June 9
1927-2 Br 46/27 nr. 2-2 Zeitschrift ftir das gesamte Luftrecht 52. Transl:
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 427 by Professor Zoliman.
185. The same decision deals with the definition of training pilots: The
question as to whether an administrative order is under the provisions of § 31
Air Traffic Art is also decided by this Judgment. See below.
186. Quoted from Professor Zollmann's translation.
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or for other expenses, the Court declared to be of no importance.
Regarding the training of pilots, the Court denied that defendant
was training student flyers as a business. It held that-the fact that
only one student had been trained s7 was sufficient to show that
defendant had not acted for the purpose of gain.
bb. The problem of defining the term "aviation enterprises"
for business and. whether circular flights for advertising might
come under such definition, arose in the case of the German cigarette
factory "Haus Bergmann."'" s Said factory which sells a cigarette
called "Gildehof" let an airplane be flown in circular flights for
advertising. The airplane had on the lower sides of the wings the
inscription "Gildehof". Tickets for circular flights were put in
every twentieth box of Gildlehof cigarettes. An authorized agent
of the company was charged with operating an aviation enterprise
without permit. The lower Court' s9 dismissed the case finding that
defendant did not act for business. The public prosecutor appealed
and the Landgericht' 90 held that defendant had undertaken an
aviation affair. On defendant's appeal, the court of last resort,
the Bayrische Oberste Landesgericht, reversed the case 1 91 and
the public prosecutor withdrew his appeal; hence the verdict of
acquittal became final.
The Court held that besides the provision of § 57 Air Traffic
Ordinance 19301,na flights for advertising are only under the general
rule of § 11 Air Traffic Act. That means that it depends on the
character of such flights whether a permit is wanted or not. *
Regarding circular flights the Bayrische Oberste Landesgericht
said that it was understood that such flights come under aviation
enterprises.' 92 § 11 Air Traffic Act provides a certificate only in the
case that the transportation of persons or things is done as a
business and the Court interpreted this proviso as follows: "The
acting for business that is required for an aviation enterprise assumes
187. The Court stated four flights with the same student on a second control stick.
188.

Decision of Bayrisches

Oberstes

Landesgericht

May

23,

1932-Rev.

Reg. II 226/1932-1932 Archly fUr Luftrecht 325. Also note 224.
.
189. Amtsgericht Neu Ulm, October 14, 1931-315/31-decision not reported
but only mentioned by Professor Oppikofer in an annotation of the decision.
1932 Archlv filr Luftrecht 328. From this annotation the facts are quoted that
are not to be found in the decision of the Oberste Landesgericht.
190. Langericht Memmingen, February 26, 1932-236/31.
191. The Court disapproved the opinion of the lower Court that defendant
operated a public affair for competition: see below. Further, the Court held that
the facts were not cleared up for the statement that defendant was aware of
lacking a permit. In so far, the case has no importance for the air law.
191a. § 75 Air Traffic Ordinance 1936.
192. The above-mentioned decision of Landgericht Plauen. had the same
point of view. The Bayrische Oberste Landesgericht refused, without further
reason, to follow the opposite opinion of Conrad in Stenglein, Strafrechtlche
Nebengesetze, 5th edition, Vol. I, p. 629. Conrad points out that transportation
by an aviation enterprise requires that the point of the start differ from the
point of the landing. His opinion seems to be isolated.
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the intention for the purpose of gain by means of carrying persons
or things by an activity that is undertaken continuously otherwise
with the intent to repeat it. However, the intention for the purpose
of indirect gain by a gratuitous performance may also be sufficient,
provided such performance has been executed within a business
activity for the purpose of promoting the business, as, increasing
sales. (Landmann-Rohmer, Gewerbe Ordnung, 8th edition, I, 1,
p. 66; 37 RGSt. 369; 46 RGSt. 327; 27 Entscheidungen des
Bayrischen Obersten Landesgerichts in Strafsachen 174; 30 dto 88.)
For the case in question it must be taken into consideration that the
firm 'Haus Bergmann Zigarettenfabrik A. G. in Dresden' as it is
stated by the Court of Appeal, manifestly intended to secure publicity
for the sale of its products by executing circular passenger flights
that were meant to increase the business and to secure profit through
it. It is immaterial that the firm did not aim for immediate profit
by carrying passengers on its advertising flights and that it did
not intend to carry passengers as a 'permanent' institution. The
contrary opinion of the Court of Appeal is incorrect. On the other
hand, it is without significance for the definition of 'acting for
business', whether the firm really acquired the profit that it endeavored
to obtain,"
The opinion of the Bayrische Oberste Landesgericht .was criticized by Professor Oppikofer.193 He pointed out that the formulation of the decision might be mistaken. In his opinion it does not
follow from § 11 Air Traffic Act that every transportation would
need a certificate as long as it is done for business with the mediate or
immediate purpose of gain. He thinks that for the definition of
"aviation enterprise" it is necessary that the purpose (which may be
the main one or. a subsidiary one) is for transportation as a business.
As he said, the purpose of the requirement of a certificate should be
of decisive importance. As it follows from the above-quoted report
on the draft of the Air Traffic Act, the permits have been required
for the protection of aviation to insure that its development is not
hindered by desultory competition. Furthermore, it was the purpose to protect public safety and order, as is shown by § 11, II Air
Traffic Act. Professor Oppikofer, taking into consideration the said
purposes, defined "aviation enterprises" as those that as an organization premeditated for a length of time offer aviation transportation
94
to the public as a business for profit.'
193.
194.
p. 59.

Annotating the decision, 1932 Archlv fur Luftrecht 328.
Approving Koffka-Bodenstein-Koffka, Luftverkehrerecht, note B I "1,
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cc. The Alntsgericht Haniburg ' denied the application of §
11 Air Traffic Act to a flight for advertising. The Court stated that
in the case before it, no persons were transported, and that there
was likewise no transportation of property, for the machinery that
was taken up was not transported but merely used during the flight
for the purpose of advertising.
b. Aviation Enterprises-Scheduled Airline-Nature of Permits
(certificates).
The different legal problems arising out of the definition of the
above mentioned terms were discussed completely by the Kamme*,.
kericht in Berlin in a criminal case. 196 The firm Nordbayrische
Verkehrflug G. m. b. H., whose manager was defendant, had maintained regular flights between Berlin and Leipzig/Mockau from
April 23 to July 21, 1928. Except on July 12, it carried a load of
newspapers fresh from the printer and accompanied by a messenger
of the publisher. Sometimes two or more passengers were also
transported. On January 15, 1927 the Reichsverkehrsministerium1, 7
had issued a temporary certificate to transport persons and property
with the power to revoke at any time and on condition that a
further permission was needed to start and operate scheduled airlines. A further permit had been issued on April 13, 1928 for certain
airlines but with reference to the airline Berlin-Leipzig/Mockau
the permit was denied, because the ministry did not find any need
for such airline. This denial was maintained over the contention
of the firm that negotiations for daily transportation of load had
already been entered into with the publishers. In his final decree
of May 8, 1928, the minister said that he did not object to flights
from Leipzig to Berlin on demand, but that flights would be classed
as scheduled if they were conducted daily approximately at the same
time and that this covered the question of ihe. transportation of
papers between these points. Defendant was charged with a violation of §§ 11, 32 nr. 5 Air Traffic Act because he had maintained,
without permission, a scheduled operation of air service by which
persons and property (i. e. newspapers) were carried every day
punctually at 5 P. M. from Berlin to Leipzig, and had continued the
flights in violation of the conditions of the temporary certificate insofar as no need had been shown and no permission had been obtained.
The Kammergericht reversed the imposed fine and acquitted the
195. Decision of November 21, 1930-XII Z 3696/30-1931 Archly ftlr
Luftrecht 77 ; transl. by Professor Zollman, 2 Journal of Air Law 591.
196. Decision of June 30, 1930-4 S. 46/30-1931 Archly ftir Luftrecht 64
translated by Professor Zollman 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 581 in extenso.
197. Ministry of the Reich for Traffic.
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defendant. From the opinion the following principles may be
deduced:
aa. Regarding the principle of freedom of trade, as laid down by
§ 1 Industrial Code (Gewerbe Ordnung) in reference to the requirement of a certificate (permit) for aviation enterprises, the Court
pointed out that transportation of persons and property as a business by aircraft is regulated by the Air Traffic Act as a special
statute and that, thus, the provisions of the Gewerbe Ordnung
apply only to the extent that the subject has not been treated
exhaustively by the Air Traffic Act and other statutes and ordinances
covering this field, such as that for Construction of Air Conveyance
of July 13, 1926198 and the still later Air Traffic Ordinance.' 9"
As the Court stated, there is an exhaustive regulation as compared
with the Gewerbeordnung for certificates required for aviation
enterprises, and, in so far, the provisions of the Gewerbe Ordnung do
200
not apply.
bb. The certificate provided by § 11 Air Traffic Act is,-as the
Kammergericht said in its opinion,-a franchise and not a permission
issued in the exercise of police power. The difference 20 1 is that
the certificate issued under the police power states that there are no
objections to the plans of the applicant, while a franchise as a
disposition of the administrative authority creates for and confers
on the grantee a subjective personal right 20 2 to establish and to
operate a certain enterprise. From its nature as a franchise the
Kammergericht inferred that in addition to the restrictions which
may be imposed by the police, the certificate required by § 11 Air
Traffic Act may be subjected also to other material limitations.
Therefore, the requirement of a special permission for scheduled
flying was not unlawful.
The opinion of the Kammergericht is not undisputed. Niemeyer, 203 Schleicher-Reymann 20 4 and Basarke 20 5 regarded the
certificate as bestowed under the police power. Niemeyer deduced
198. 1926 R. G. B1. I 643.
199. Decision of June 30, 1930. The Ordinance was issued in the meantime. The Court quotes here: von Landmann-Rohmer, Gewerbeordnung 8th ed.
Vol. I. 1. pp. 56, 57, 101. Bredow-Milller, Luftverkehrsgesetz p. 135 ; Busse, Luftverkehrsgesetz, p. 86.
200. The question was important because defendant urged that under the
principle of freedom of trade in so far as special provisions in the Industrial
Code (Gewerbeornung) were lacking, the conditions which are enforced by § 32
nr. 5 Air Traffic Act must be based upon the general police power.
201. See Fleiner, Institutionen des Deutschen Verwaltungsrechts, 8th ed.
p. 341, 344; Otto Mayer, Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht 3rd ed. Vol. II p. 243.
202. Subjektives dffentliches Recht.
203. Annotating this decision. 1931 Juristische Wochenschrift 901 foot note.
204. Recht der Luftfahrt § 11, no. 5, p. 95.
205. 1927 Zeitschrift ftir dasgesamte Luftrecht, p. 64; same opinion:
Busse, Luftverkehrsgesetz, p. 15; Huber, Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht (1932)
p. 83.
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from it that the reservation of revocation at any time was not legal. 2 °
Another point of view was taken by von Unruh -0 7 that the certificate
required under § 11 Air Traffic Act is a form for the admission
to air traffic whose legal nature is different according to different
conditions; to him the certificate for an aviation enterprise is an
exercise of police power, the certificate for operation of an airline is a
franchise.
cc. The Kammergericht held it proper for a certificate to be
issued subject to material restrictions. 0 8s As to the content of such
restriction, the Court said that once the permission to carry persons
and property by aircraft has been granted under the proviso that
only scheduled flying needs special permission, such special permission must be limited to scheduled flying, but that the conditions of the
special permission dealing with operating an airline might not be
inconsistent with the general permission for operating an aviation
enterprise. Besides this, the Court pointed out that such provisions
should be clear and beyond all doubt in wording and meaning if
they are supposed to be enforced by the penal clause of § 32, nr. .5
Air Traffic Act.
dd. Proceeding from the developed principles the Kammergericht had to inquire into whether the defendant had established
and operated a scheduled airline. Since the first permission of 1927
contained no other restriction than that regarding the requirement
of a special permit for a scheduled airline, defendant was only
guilty if the transportation of newspapers from Berlin to Leipzig
was done on a scheduled airline. On the other hand, if there was
not a scheduled airline, the Ministry, as the Court pointed out, did
not have the right to prohibit the transportation through its decree
of May 8, 1928 which declared that flights on demand would become
a scheduled airline if they were conducted daily approximately at.
the same time, and that this covered also the transportation of the
papers. For, with respect to the opinion of the Kammergericht
regarding the only admissible object for the special permission, such
special permission -was only to be required in so far as a scheduled
airline had been operated. If it was not a scheduled airline, the
decree of May 8th was unlawful in so far as .it prohibited the
transportation of newspapers from Berlin to Leipzig. Then it
was the question of whether said decree of May 8th contained a par206.

question.
207.

The Kammergericht for the case at bar had no reason to discuss this
Lufthafenrecht,

Luftverkehrsrecht, p. 61.

p.

70,

n.

106;

agreeing

Koffka-Bodenstein-Koffka,

It is to be noticed that in both cases the certificate is

based upon § 11 Air Traffic Act.

208.

Today § 41 Air Traffic Ordinance in connection with § 12 of the man-

dates for aviation enterprises and § 119 Air.Traffic Ordinance provide that such

restrictions might be imposed.

GERMAN AIR LAW-A

CASE HISTORV

tial revocation of the general permission that defendant's firm had
obtained in 1927. It may be doubtful whether such revocation
would have been permissible 20 9 and the Kammergericht gives no
decision; following a well established rule in German jurisprudence
it held that, even though such a revocation might be permitted, it must
be by a clear and express declaration. The Court found that the
decree mentioned did not contain such a clear declaration.
The Kammergericht's discussion of the meaning of the words
"scheduled airline" 21 0 is merely of historical interest since the Air
212
Traffic Ordinance gave a. legal definition:211 'air line traffic'
means a "regular and public air transportation of persons or property
on designated stretches." The Court found an equal definition from
the general sense of the words compared with similar expressions
used in other statutes based upon corresponding considerations
regarding traffic policy. - 1 3 Examining the facts found in the trial

with reference to the developed definition, the Court stated that the
transportation of the newspapers daily at the same time did not
constitute a "scheduled airline". Because the aircraft served exclusively the needs of one newspaper publisher, the Court held that
the operation had not had a piblic use, that is, a use which is open
to everyone and upon which everyone can rely. Against this, the
regularity and punctuality of the flights were of no weight in the
reasoning of the Court since this was dependent of the goods to be
transported. Newspapers must arrive daily at about the same time,
and after their arrival at the airport they must be forwarded at once
in order to be distributed at their destination on the same day. If the
expression "flights on demand"2 14 is to be used, 21 5 as the Court held,
the wanted flights could not become a scheduled aiirline traffic,
unless it was at the service of the public and conducted with such
regularity and frequency that the public could rely on it. The Court
said in its opinion that the decree of May 8 erred in alleging that a
flight performed daily at approximately the same time becomes a
209.
210.

See note 206.
Planmdssige Luftlinie.

211.

§ 42 Air Traffic Ordinance (wording 1936).

Traffic Ordinance (wording of 1930)

The definition' in § 54 Air

further mentioned that

ransportation was

performed for pay. The amendment does not affect the matter-itself. As § 42,
II Air Traffic Ordinance (wording of 1936) shows, also in its new wording, the
Act provides that transportation will be paid; the 'permission covers not only
the:schedule and air transport stipulations, but also the rates for air transportation.
212. Fluglinienverkehr.
213. The Court took into account the Act in regard toAut'omobile:-ines of
August 26, 1925 and the Ordinance of October 20, 1928 (R. G. 1l. I, 380).
The viewpoints for a definition of an automobile line are here: transport, designated routes, certain amount of:regularity, serving public needs and for pay.
See the opinion in detail with quotations of books and cases. - .
1 11
214. "Bedarfsverkehr", that means occasional flights as needed.
215. The Kammergericht opposed the expression because it doubted that it
is conducive to clear the legal situation, particularly since the traffic on schedtiled air lines (Fluglinienverkehr) includes flights on demand. (Bedarfsverkehr),"
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scheduled airline. The Court pointed out that, whenever the
planes, in accordance with a contract, carried newspaper freight
accompanied by a messenger daily (except July 12, 1928), no public
transportation was operated, since this transportation was limited
to the newspaper publisher and not open to everybody. A scheduled
airline traffic could also be created by carrying passengers. The Court
considered the fact that on some days other persons were transported,
but it did not find that the general public had a regular opportunity
for transport from Berlin to Leipzig/Mockau. Under the contract
with the publisher the newspapers had to be transported regularly
and - as the Court stated - it depended on its variable volume
whether other passengers could be carried besides the messenger.
From this the Court deduces that by the transportation of passengers a scheduled airline has not been created because the essential
element of regularity was lacking. The fact that the timetables
made reference to the route was held as of no consequence since
the annotation was made "flight on demand." The Court concluded with the statement that "even though it may be true that
timetables are evidence that the route is operated as a public
scheduled airline, this conclusion is rebutted by the note 'flight on
demand.' Only the actual operation of the line on a particular
route is 'decisive' for the problem of whether a scheduled airline
exists or not." 216
3. Aviation Affairs
a. Definition:
For the arrangement of the so-called aviation affairs, 217 a
certificate is required under § 11 Air Traffic Act if they are got up
2 18 or exhibit.2 1 9
for the purpose of contest
aa. In the decisions of the Sch6ffengericht Liegnitz 220 and of
the Strafkammer of the Landgericht Liegnitz 221 the question to be
decided was whether an affair during which the ascent and chasing
of two balloons by motorvehicles was arranged in such a way that
the balloons' landing places were the destination of the motorcars
216. It may be added that the Kammergericht did not consider whether the
transport of the newspapers accompanied by a messenger violated the provisions
of Postal Law because a criminal prosecution under said regulation presupposed
action by the Postal Authority as a necessary condition and such action was
not taken.
217.

"Luftfahrtveraustaltungen":

a public performance

in

which air con-

veyances participate.
218. "Im Dienste des Wettbewerbes."
219. "Im Dienste der Schaulust."
220. Decision of April 28, 1926-10/1 J 52/24-1927/28 Zeltschrift ftir das
gesamte Luftreeht 223.
221. Decision of November 10, 1927-1. N. 8/27-1928 Zeltschrift ftir das

~60

gesamte Luftrecht 51. Translated 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 430 by Profesor
Zollman.
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and motorcycles, was to be certificated under § 11 Air Traffic Act.
Both decisions held that defendants were not guilty, the lower Court
because it did not find that for said performance a certificate was
needed, the higher Court 222 because it did not find that defendants
were the promoters. The Sch6ffengericht Liegnitz expressed some
doubt as to whether the flight of two balloons was under the rules
of the Air Traffic Act, since the Act's purpose was to regulate air
traffic and, in the feeling of the Court, such regulation did not appear
needed for the actual flight of two balloons. As § 11 Air Traffic
Act shows, it cannot be disputed that every flight of balloons, is
under the provisions of the Air Traffic Act and that the Court's
idea was erroneous. In fact, the Sch6ffengericht did not found
the decision on the mentioned misconstruction. However, from the
opinion of the Sch6ffengericht it is not quite clear whether the
Court held that it was a public performance in which air conveyance
participated. In its opinion the Court declared-and in so far the
higher Court agreed-that the words "for contest" meant a competition between aircraft or between air conveyances and vehicles on
land, and that no competition was arranged here either between the
balloons or- its pilots; they did not act as competitors.
With regard to the question of whether an exhibition was
arranged by the balloon ascent and chasing, the Sch6ffengericht
stated that whenever a crowd was attracted to inspect the performance there was no exhibition as provided by § 11 Air Traffic Act,
since the promoters had no intention of giving one. Regarding the
balloon chasing the Landgericht agreed, but not regarding the
ascent, finding that the purpose of the ascent was to gain public
interest and new members for the Association for the Promotion of
Aerial Navigation whose branch in Liegnitz had been founded just
before. From such purpose the Court concluded that an exhibition
was given by creating on the part of the public the desire to see the
performance and by satisfying such desire. Since the Landgericht
held that only the ascent of the balloons was an "aviation affair for
exhibition," it acquitted the members of the automobile club who had
arranged the chasing and explained that the leading members of the
Association were the responsible organizers.
bb. In reference to the definition of the words "for contest"
228
in the above mentioned decision of the Amtsgericht Hamburg,
it was said that flying an airplane for advertising is not affected
by § 11 Air Traffic Act because this rule provides for competition of
222.

The public Prosecutor had appealed.

223. November 21, 1930-XII Z 3696/30-1931 Archlv fAr Luftrecht 77
Translated Journal of Air Law 591 by Professor Zollmann.
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aircraft. A definition of "contest" in its proper sense is not to be
found in German decisions.
cc. The above reviewed judgment of the Bayrische Oberste
Landesgericht 224 examines the term "aviation affairs for exhibition"
in relation to flying for advertising. The Court in its opinion said:
"Aviation affairs for exhibition are such that present to the public
something worth inspecting. They wish to create the desire of the
public to see the performance and they are arranged for show and,
according to practical experience, are planned and qualified for
amusement and entertainment. Such definition does not coincide
with flights for advertising-also with such passenger flights-insofar
as the advertising is only done by inscriptions and special public
flying or parachute jumps,displays-as, for instance, acrobatic
' 223
are not connected with the flight."
b. Prohibition af aviation affair.
From the denial of a certificate required under § 11 Air Traffic
Act there is no appeal when the Minister for Aviation has issued
the decision. If the decision is given by the air board 226 ocmplaints
may be made to the Minister.2 27 The prohibition of acrobatic
flights by the police authority has been discussed by the Landgericht
Erfurt. 221 Plaintiff was prepared for an aerial circus. The proper
permission as required under § 11 Air Traffic Act and issued by the
authority contained the proviso that plaintiff had to take out an
insurance policy against liability covering all damages from the
affair up to the amount of the highest sum provided by the law.
The insurance policy of the plaintiff read in part as follows:
"Insurance protection will be given only if the aviation affair and
the flying field are duly permitted by the authority and recognized
by the German Air Council2 2 . . . Liability claims from parachute
jumps or other acrobatic exercises are excluded. Acrobatic flying
and stunts are excluded."
The day before the affair was scheduled to take place the
superintendent of the air police station stopped the performance
since plaintiff had not secured the required insurance protection.
188.

224.

May 23, 1932-I

226/1932-1932-Archlv fOr Luftrecht 325. See note

. 225.
See also 1933 Archly fUr Luftrecht 263: Cour d'Appel Grenoble
July 22, 1933: circular flights of the same pilot are not public display arranged

for show. (Evolution constituant tin spectacle public) in the sense of Article 23
French Air Traffic Act.
226. Luftamt.
227. § 6 Ordinance April 18. 1934 (R.G.Bl. I 310) dealing with the
organization of the aviation administration by the Reich. Formerly § 18 Air
Traffic Act provided a complaint to be filedwith the administrative jurisdiction.
§ 18 has been amended by the Act of December 15, 1933, and August 21, 1936.
228. Decision of Jan. 9, 1933-2.0.8/32-1934 Archiv fUr Luftrecht 101.
229. Deutscher Luftrat.
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The plaintiff sued the State for damages resting upon the contention
that the superintendent had committed a breach of official duty by
imposing the prohibition at a time when plaintiff still had the
opportunity to take out insurance. The case was dismissed. The
Court pointed out that the liability under Art. 131 German Constitution is given if a civil servant infringes an official duty. But in the
Court's finding there was no such infringement. The Court established that plaintiff had nl-Ochance to"take out insurance from
the moment when the affair had been prohibited (Saturday afternoon) until the time scheduled for the performance, (Sunday)
since between Saturday afternoon and Sunday morning, the offices
of the insurance company, with which plaintiff was in connection,
were closed. The policy which was introduced by plaintiff did
not comply with the proviso of the permission since the recognition of the air council was lacking, and acrobatic flying etc.
was excluded. The Court seemed to have no doubt that the
permission connected with a condition was valid. Insurance is
compulsory under § 29 Air Traffic Act and the Authority is bound
to fix the amount of the insurance.23 0 As § 29 Air Traffic Act
provided, the insurance was to be proved before the certificate was
issued. This means that the Authority had to fix the amount of the
required insurance, applicant had to take out the insurance, and to
prove it to the Authority and, only then, the certificate was to be
issued. The rule was amended by the Act of July 29, 1936, and
now there is no proviso regarding the time at which the insurance
protection is to be proved. In fact, at the time of the case at
bar, the proceedings of the Authority did not correspond with the
literal wording of the law. However, such proceeding was admitted
since by such simplification of the routine the position of applicants
was made easier. In reference to the decision, there will be no
doubt that the "aviation affair" was not duly permitted and the
prohibition of the air police superintendent was justified.
4. Taxation.
a. Regarding

circular flights

the Saxon

Oberverwaltungs-

gericlt 2 3 1 held that there was no exemption from entertainment

taxes. The Court did not overlook the fact that the purpose of such
flights was to make clear to the public that flying was neither
dangerous nor injurious to health and to propagandize long distance
flight, but, as it stated, this did not alter the character of circular
flights as entertainment.
119

230.
§§ 56 III, 53, 110 Air Traffic Ordinance (wording 1930) §§ 44, 41, 106,
(wording 1936).
231.
Decision of July 24, 1930-14. 1I. 1930-1931 Archiv fWr Luftrecht 264.
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b. The arrangement of acrobatic flights and parachute jumps
has been held subject to the entertainments tax by the Prussian
Oberverwaltungsgericht. 23 2 The Court held that the exemption which
was provided for gymnastic exercises did not apply since the performance was made for business. The Court pointed out that a
subsidiary purpose to promote the interest in aviation did not
233
supersede its character as entertainment.
177. 232. Decision of June 27, 1933-I1 C 214/32-1934 Archly ftlr Luftrecht
233. Some decrees of the Minister (cf. 1928 Preussisches Ministerial Blatt
fUr Innere Verwaltung 271) recommended to the counties they might exempt
aviation affairs under certain conditions. But such recommendation Is not an
exemption.

